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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES D. KENT, 
Grievant/Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 920676-CA 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT Argument Priority No. 13 
SECURITY, and the 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Agency / Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
As stated by Grievant/Petitioner at page 2 of his Brief, 
this case is an appeal from a final agency action of the Career 
Service Review Board. Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-30(2) 
(Supp. 1992) provides that grievances based on dismissal from 
employment are governed by Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46b, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). The Career Service 
Review Board (CSRB) has designated all of its adjudicative 
1 
proceedings as formal for purposes of UAPA Section 63-46b-4. 
See Utah Admin- Code R137-1-17.B. (1992). 
Grievant/Petitioner Kent (Grievant) asserts in his Brief, 
page 1, that: 
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as 
amended) confers jurisdiction upon the 
Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, a.s 
provided by statute. to review all final 
agency actions resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Grievant further asserts that Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1992 & Supp. 1992) grants jurisdiction of this case to 
this Court. 
UAPA Section 63-46b-l(8) (1989 & Supp. 1992), states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted 
to provide an independent basis for 
jurisdiction to review final agency action« 
This provision is consistent with the language of UAPA Section 
63-46b-16(l), "As provided by statute . . .". Clearly, UAPA 
Section 63-46b-16(1), only becomes operational if some statute 
other than the UAPA confers jurisdiction on this Court. 
This Court has previously held that U.C.A. Section 78-2a-
3(2)(a) does not by itself confer jurisdiction on this Court to 
review final agency action. See DeBry v. Salt Lake County 
Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988), in which 
Jackson, J. speaking for the Court said, referring specifically 
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a): 
This general statute defines the outermost 
limits of our appellate jurisdiction, 
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allowing us to review agency decisions only 
when the legislature expressly authorizes a 
right of review. [Citations omitted.] It 
is not a catchall provision authorizing us 
to review the orders of every 
administrative agency for which there is no 
statute specifically creating a right to 
judicial review. In the absence of such a 
specific statute, we have no jurisdiction. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Id., at pages 627-628. 
Grievant may be entitled to seek an extraordinary writ 
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) . 
See Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 
P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). But to this point Grievant has plainly 
failed to state a jurisdictional basis for his appeal. 
The balance of this brief is written on the assumption 
that this Court may conclude it does in fact have jurisdiction 
apart from Rule 65B to consider Grievant's appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues raised by Grievant are actually sub-issues of 
the primary issue. Respondent Department of Employment 
Security (Department) believes the issues should be stated as 
follows: 
1. Can a State employee with career service status of 
Schedule B pursuant to U.C.A. Section 67-19-15(2)(b) 
(Supp. 1992) be terminated under U.C.A. Section 67-19-18 
(Supp. 1992) and its implementing rules because of the 
employee's conviction of the crime of forging an 
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endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check issued against the 
Federal Social Security Fund? 
a. Did the CSRB abuse its discretion by affirming the 
Department's reliance on "professional standards"? 
b. Did the CSRB abuse its discretion by determining 
there was a nexus between Grievant's off-duty conduct 
and his employment? 
c. Did the CSRB abuse its discretion by holding that 
Grievant may be terminated from one position for 
misconduct that occurred while he held a different 
position in the Department? 
Grievant has stated in his brief, at pages 2-3, that the 
standard of review for each of the foregoing issues requires 
"analysis for correctness". The Department disputes the 
standard of review urged by Grievant. The standard of review 
of CSRB cases will be discussed in depth in Point I of the 
Argument herein. 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative of this 
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A, and include the 
following: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l (1991 
Supp.). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-4 (1991 
Supp.). 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16 (1991 
Supp.). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18(1) (1986 & 
Supp. 1992). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-30(2) (Supp. 
1992) . 
Utah Admin. Code R468-11-1 (presently 477-
11-1) (effective July 1, 1991). 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-17.B. (1992). 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20 (1992). 
Other references by Grievant to statutes or rules are not 
relevant to this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By notice dated October 4, 1991, Grievant's immediate 
supervisor advised Grievant that the supervisor intended to 
recommend to the Department Administrator, Mr. Floyd G. Astin, 
that Grievant be dismissed from his employment for cause. 
After conducting a pre-termination hearing, Mr. Astin issued a 
disciplinary decision dated December 3, 1991, terminating 
Grievant effective December 6, 1991. (See Appendix B) 
Grievant advanced his grievance of the dismissal to Step 5 
at the CSRB. A hearing was held before a CSRB hearing officer 
on February 7, 1992. The hearing officer issued a decision on 
March 31, 1992, upholding Grievantfs dismissal from State 
employment. 
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Grievant then advanced his grievance to Step 6 at the 
CSRB. The CSRB adopted the findings of its hearing officer 
and upheld Grievant's dismissal by decision dated October 20, 
1992. Grievant thereafter filed his Petition for Review with 
this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Grievant's Statement of Facts is incomplete and contains 
two errors. The facts pertinent to this case and to the 
Grievantfs termination are as follows: 
Grievant was hired by the Department on October 9, 1984 as 
an Accountant, in a non-career status. Record at 293-294 
(All notations hereafter prefixed by "R" refer to pages in the 
record which are set forth in numerical order in Appendix C.) 
On January 13, 1986, Grievant1s employment status was changed 
to Career Service Schedule B. R. 296 In January 1989 
Grievant was promoted to the position of Field Auditor. R. 308 
Grievant's duties from the time of his hire until his 
promotion in January, 1989, consisted of collecting employer 
contributions and benefit overpayments owed to the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund, a trust fund created by U.C.A. Section 35-4-9 
(1988). R. 308-310, 312-313, [Ag. Exh. 5 at R. L81] Upon 
promotion to the position of Field Auditor, Grievant assumed 
the additional duties to audit employers, verify quarterly wage 
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reports and assess employers for deficiencies in reported wages 
and contributions. R. 310, 312, [Ag. Exh. 6 at R. 182] 
On May 1, 1991, Grievant was indicted by a Federal Grand 
Jury on ten (10) counts of fraudulently endorsing Social 
Security checks made out to his deceased father during a 
period in 1986. R. 316, 406 Grievant's immediate supervisor. 
Mr. Don Avery, learned about the indictment from a Department 
employee and asked Grievant if he was the person indicted by 
the Federal Grand Jury. R. 316-317 Grievant then explained to 
Mr. Avery what had transpired and "professed his innocence". 
R. 317 Mr. Avery thereupon restricted Grievant's duties 
(R. 317), placed him under close supervision (R. 318), advised 
him that a guilty ple^ or conviction could impact his 
employment (R. 319), and instructed Grievant to keep Mr. Avery 
informed of the progress of the case. R. 320 
Grievant was placed on restricted duties pending the 
outcome of his case because Field Auditors hold a very high 
profile position in the Department. R. 318, line 23 through 
R. 319, line 10; R. 323, line 21 through R. 324, line 2 They 
continually handle trust fund monies, have access to employers' 
confidential financial information, and even quite often are 
given checkbooks by employers in which pre-signed blank checks 
are kept. R. 323-324, 
Mr. Avery became the Chief of Contributions about the 
first of August, 1992, some time after the retirement of 
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Mr. Dean Kimber. R. 334-335 Despite having instructed 
Grievant in 1991 to keep Mr. Avery informed, Grievant failed to 
give any information to Mr. Avery unless and until Mr. Avery 
requested updates. R. 326-327, 414 
Although Grievant alleges that he told Mr. Avery's 
predecessor, Mr. Dean Kimber, about an August 8 court date, 
Mr. Avery had been aware only that Grievant was scheduled for a 
court appearance "sometime in the fall", and was not informed 
of the scheduled court appearance for August 8, 1992, until 
another supervisor in the Department called him about it. 
R. 327 Grievant did not at any time prior to August 8, 1992, 
tell Mr. Avery about the scheduled court appearance, and in 
particular did not let Mr. Avery know of Grievant's intent to 
plead guilty. R. 327, 402 
On August 8, 1993, Grievant pled guilty to one count of 
fraudulently endorsing a United States Treasury check dated 
September 3, 1986, in the amount of $310. R. 329, 393, [GR. 
Exh. 3, at R. 164; AG. Exh. 2, at R. 176] On September 13, 
1991, Mr. Avery addressed a letter to his supervisor in which 
he reported the fact of Grievant's guilty plea and concluded 
that if the offense did not justify termination that Grievant 
be transferred out of the Contributions Section. R. 330 [GR. 
Exh. 2, at R. 163] 
After receiving verbal response to his letter, on 
October 4, 1991 Mr. Avery gave Grievant a notice of intent to 
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discipline through dismissal. R. 331, [Ag. Exh. 3, at R. 177] 
Grievant filed a written response to the notice of intent to 
discipline and thereafter Mr. Avery issued a recommendation to 
the Administrator, Mr. Floyd G. Astin, that Grievant be 
dismissed for cause. R. 332 
On November 15, 1991 Mr. Floyd Astin conducted a Step 4 
informal pre-termination hearing with Grievant to hear 
Grievant's response to Mr. Avery's recommendation of dismissal. 
R. 333, 354 The result of the hearing was a written decision 
by Mr. Astin, issued on December 3, 1991, in which Mr. Astin 
concluded that Grievantfs "act of forgery and failure to 
communicate openly and honestly" with his supervisor had 
disabled Grievant from being able to work effectively as an 
employee of the Department. R. 354-356, [Ag. Exh. 1, at 
R. 173] 
Grievant thereafter pursued his appeal rights with the 
CSRB and this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whether this appeal comes to the Court as an appeal of 
right or as a Rule 65B petition for extraordinary writ because 
of a lack of other adequate remedy at law, the standard of 
review on the factual findings is that such findings will be 
upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence when the 
record is reviewed as a whole. 
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The Court will determine whether the sanctions imposed by 
the Department on the employee were disproportionate to the 
offense by considering whether the Department abused its 
discretion. The standard of review for determining whether 
there was an abuse of discretion is the intermediate standard. 
That is, the Court will affirm the employee's dismissal if that 
sanction is reasonable and rational under the circumstances of 
the case. 
The findings of fact at Step 4 (the Administrator's 
decision), Step 5 (the hearing officer's decision), and Step 6 
(the CSRB's decision) are supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. Those findings are sufficient to justify the 
sanction of dismissal. 
The Grievant had actual or constructive notice of the 
conduct that was expected of him. His conduct, both at the 
time he committed the crime of forgery and when he failed to 
inform his supervisor of the progress of the federctl criminal 
case, caused the Department to lose confidence and trust in 
Grievant. This loss of confidence and trust was directly 
related to Grievant's employment and occurred while he held 
positions for which such confidence and trust are vital. His 
dismissal from State service was appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD IF THERE IS A FACTUAL 
BASIS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE EMPLOYING 
DEPARTMENT AND THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL IS NOT 
DISPROPORTIONATE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
This Court has recently stated that: 
The CSRB's role in examining the 
Department's personnel actions is a limited 
one. The CSRB is restricted to determining 
whether there is factual support for the 
Department's charges against [grievant] 
and, if so, whether the Department's 
s a n c t i o n of dismissal is so 
disproportionate to those charges that it 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 443 
(Utah App. 1991) . This conclusion by the Court was based, in 
part, on a rule of the CSRB found at Utah Admin. Code R665-1-
25.4 (1987-88), which at the time of the Despain decision 
required the CSRB hearing officer to "give latitude and 
deference" to the agency's decision. 
The rule applicable to this case is found at Utah Admin. 
Code R137-1-20 (1992), which provides in part: 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record, with both parties 
being accorded full administrative due 
process. The hearing officer shall give 
latitude and consideration to an agency's 
prior decision when the latter is supported 
by the findings of fact based on the 
evidence. [Emphasis added.] 
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It should perhaps be noted that this rule was amended effective 
January, 1993, and is presently considerably more detailed than 
the version of the rule that appears in the 1992 Utah Admin. 
Code. However, the CSRB rule once again requires the CSRB 
hearing officer to "give deference" to the agency decision if 
the factual findings support the agency's allegations. 
While the change in wording from "deference" to 
"consideration" and back to "deference" could be reviewed from 
the perspective of the dictionary meanings of the words, the 
history of the CSRB's rule and prior court decisions appear to 
make it plain that the role of the CSRB is .Limited to 
determining whether there is factual support for the agency's 
allegations and, if so, whether the agency abused its 
discretion in imposing th€> sanction of dismissal. See 
Despain, at pages 442-443. 
Although Despain is not quite as clear on the role of the 
appellate courts in reviewing a CSRB decision, the outcome of 
Despain clearly demonstrates that this Court will apply the 
same standards to its review of a CSRB decision as the Court 
applies to the role of the CSRB in reviewing the Agency's 
decision. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
To determine whether there is factual support for a 
decision of the CSRB, this Court applies a "substantial 
12 
evidence" standard. See UAPA, Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). This 
standard has been stated as: 
. . . [T]his court grants great deference 
to an agency's findings and will uphold 
them if they are "supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court". [Citation 
omitted.] "Substantial evidence" has been 
defined as "such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion." [Citations 
omitted.] In applying the substantial 
evidence test, we review the "whole record" 
before the court, and consider both 
evidence that supports the Board's findings 
and evidence that fairly detracts from 
them. Id. It is the petitioner's duty to 
properly present the record, by marshaling 
all of the evidence supporting the findings 
and showing that, despite that evidence 
and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn therefrom, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 
1991). Two very recent appellate court decisions confirm this 
standard. See King v. Industrial Commission. 209 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 3 (Utah App. 1993) ; and Semeco v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (Utah 1993). 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
As stated above, the appellate courts of Utah will review 
the question of whether a sanction imposed by a State agency is 
so disproportionate to the charges against the employee as to 
amount to an abuse of discretion. The section of UAPA 
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applicable to this type of review is Section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i). 
Grievant suggests in his Brief that the appropriate 
standard of review is an "analysis for correctness". However, 
Grievant offers no explanation for that conclusion. 
Respondents believe the conclusion is in error for the reasons 
set forth in the following paragraphs. 
It appears clear from the cases cited above that the 
appellate courts of this State have already determined that the 
imposition of sanctions against a State employee is a 
discretionary act. As such, the appellate courts will apply a 
standard of reasonableness and rationality to the exercise of 
such discretion. See King v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
However, in Semeco the Supreme Court, through Howe, 
A.C.J., stated: 
But if there i s no d i sce rn ib le 
l e g i s l a t i v e in ten t as to how a s t a t u t e 
should be in te rpre ted or applied, Morton 
s u g g e s t s t h a t a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
s t a t u t e could c o n s t i t u t e a subsection 
( 4 ) ( h ) ( i ) c h a l l e n g e and so r e c e i v e 
intermediate review. Morton thus d i r e c t s 
cour ts and a t torneys to carefu l ly consider 
w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r agency a c t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s a simple i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or 
a p p l i c a t i o n of law, reviewed under 
subsection (4) (d) , or merely an exerc ise of 
i m p l i c i t l y d e l e g a t e d d i s c r e t i o n t o 
i n t e r p r e t or apply the law, reviewed under 
subsection ( 4 ) ( h ) ( i ) . 
209 Utah Adv. Rep., a t pages 78-79. 
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The statutory provision itself, U.C.A. Section 67-19-
18(1), appears on its face to contain an explicit grant of 
discretion to State agencies: 
(1) Career service employees may be 
dismissed or demoted only to advance the 
good of the public interest, and for just 
causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, 
failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, 
disloyalty to the orders of a superior, 
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in 
office. [Emphasis added.] 
The language "such as" indicates a legislative intent not to 
limit application of the law only to the offenses enumerated. 
Furthermore, the offenses enumerated within the provision are 
subject to two or more interpretations, although past court 
decisions in Utah and other jurisdictions may provide 
considerable guidelines for such interpretations. 
The Supreme Court, in its first detailed analysis of UAPA 
Section 63-46b-16, provided guidance that has become more clear 
as additional cases have developed. In Morton International, 
Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Court explained: 
When there is no discernible 
legislative intent concerning a specific 
issue the legislature has, in effect, left 
the issue unresolved. In such a case, it 
is appropriate to conclude that the 
legislature has delegated to the agency to 
decide the issue. Such an approach is 
particularly appropriate when it is 
reasonable to assume that the legislature 
intended the agency to have some discretion 
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in dealing with the statutory provision at 
issue, [Emphasis added.] 
814 P. 2d, at page 589. 
That the legislature intended state agencies to have 
discretion in dealing with employees is almost self-evident. 
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Matter of Discharge of 
Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986), agencies have the 
responsibility to manage their employees: 
The second Vetterli inquiry, whether the 
charges warrant the sanction imposed, is a 
limited one. The sheriff must manage and 
direct his deputies, and is in the best 
position to know whether their actions 
merit discipline. If the Merit Commission 
finds upon review that the facts support 
the charges against the deputy, then it 
must affirm the sheriff's disciplinary 
action, unless it finds the sanction so 
clearly disproportionate to the charges as 
to amount to an abuse of the sheriff's 
discretion. [Citation omitted; emphasis 
added.] 
720 P.2d, at page 1363. 
Given the language of the statute it seems rather obvious 
that its application is an exercise of delegated discretion to 
interpret and apply the law under UAPA Section 63-46b-
16(4) (h)(i), and not just a simple interpretation or 
application of the law itself, under UAPA Section 63-46b-
16(4)(d). Thus, the intermediate standard of review of 
reasonable and rational is appropriate for this case. 
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Furthermore, in defining the term "abuse of discretion" in 
the context of State employee grievances this Court quoted in 
Despain from a California case as follows: 
[I]f the penalty imposed was under all the 
facts and circumstances clearly excessive, 
this will be deemed an abuse of discretion. 
. . . In determining whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion the Supreme 
Court of this state [California] has stated 
that "If reasonable minds might differ as 
to the propriety of the penalty imposed, 
this fact serves to fortify the conclusion 
that the [administrative body] acted within 
the area of its discretion." 
824 P.2d, at page 448 [quoting from Szmaciarz v. California 
State Personnel Board, 79 Cal. App.3d 904, 145 Cal.Rptr. 396, 
405-406 (1978).] 
Finally, the rules of the Department of Human Resource 
Management (DHRM) , which has the duty to oversee the 
implementation of the State Merit laws, has promulgated its 
rules, acknowledging the discretion agencies have in 
disciplining their employees. Specifically, Utah Admin. Code 
R468-11-2.(2)(d) (1991) provides: 
(2)(d) Following such a hearing [the 
hearing before the agency head] an employee 
may be dismissed or demoted if the 
department head finds adequate cause or 
reason. [Emphasis added.] 
See also Utah Admin. Code R468-11-1.(4) (1991). 
As will be demonstrated in POINTS II and III of this 
Brief, the findings of the Administrator of the Department of 
Employment Security, the CSRB hearing officer, and the CSRB 
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itself, are supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
and the sanction imposed against the Grievant in this case, 
given all of the circumstances that exist in the case, was 
reasonable and rational. 
POINT II 
THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL IMPOSED ON GRIEVANT WAS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE OF RECORD. 
Grievant was discharged for two reasons: First, he pled 
guilty to the crime of forging an endorsement on a IKS. 
Treasury check, which he committed while employed by the 
Department in a position involving collection of monies for the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund. Second, he failed to keep his 
supervisor informed about the progress of the federal criminal 
case against him, as he had been specifically instructed to do. 
Both the CSRB hearing officer and the CSRB itself agreed that 
there was substantial evidence to support the factueil findings 
of the Department's Administrator. 
When an appellant disagrees with the findings of fact of 
an agency, the appellant has the duty to marshal all of the 
evidence, both for and against the disputed findings. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 
1989); Department of Air Force v. Swider, supra at 448, 451 In 
the instant case Grievant has set forth in his Brief a partial 
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partial statement of the facts, but has not identified specific 
findings which Grievant considers in dispute. 
Instead, Grievant has simply stated his version of two 
key findings alleging that: 1) Grievant specifically told Dean 
Kimber about the August 8, 1991 court date at which Grievant 
pled guilty to fraud or forgery; and 2) an individual named 
Iturbe told Grievant that he, Iturbe, would "take care" of 
reporting to the Department about the outcome of the August 8 
court hearing. Based on these "facts", Grievant argues that 
his dismissal was improper. 
This Court has repeatedly said that it will not disturb 
findings of fact unless the appellant can demonstrate that the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Stewart v. 
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992); Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, supra; Johnson v. Board of 
Review, 842 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1992). Compare Ohline Corp. v. 
Granite Mill, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah App. 1993). 
With respect to Grievant's argument that he told the 
former Chief of Contributions about his August 8 court date, 
and that a Mr. Iturbe would "take care" of the reporting, the 
record is clear that even if these matters were true, they did 
not comply with the instructions Grievant was given by his own 
supervisor, Mr. Don Avery, to keep Mr. Avery informed of the 
progress of his case. 
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Mr. Avery testified in the Step 5 evidentiary hearing as 
follows: 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Kent [Grievant] to keep you 
informed of the progress of the case 
against him? 
A. Yes, I did. I asked him if — if 
throughout this process, if he would keep 
me updated as to what was transpiring so 
that I was aware of — of the situation,. 
R. 320, lines 11-16 
Q. At any time did he ever come to you and 
say, "I need to bring you up-to-date on my 
case," or anything to that effect? 
A. Not once. 
Q. In fact, you had to ask him every time 
what was going on? 
A. Yes. R. 326, line 22, through R. 327, 
line 3 
Q. But he did not come to you at any time 
prior to August 8th to let you know that he 
had a court date? 
A. No, he did not. R. 327, lines 19-22 
In addition, Mr. Astin, the Department Administrator, 
testified in the Step 5 hearing before the CSRB hearing officer 
that he asked Grievant why Grievant did not keep his supervisor 
informed about his case, and Grievant failed to explain why or 
that he informed anyone else: 
Q. Did Mr. Kent ever state to you either in 
his hearing or at any other time that he 
had told the Chief of Contributions at 
that time, Mr. Dean Kimber, that he had an 
August 8th hearing date? 
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A. No. As a matter of fact, that did not come 
out. The questions were asked as to why he 
didnft inform his supervisor, and that was 
never mentioned he did inform anybody. 
Q. Did Mr. Kent say to you at any time that he 
had told Mr. Kimber or anybody else that he 
intended to plead guilty at that August 8th 
date? 
A. Again, that was asked and there was no 
indication of doing that. R. 379, line 21 
through R. 380, line 9 
Grievant did not at any time during his Step 5 hearing 
dispute Mr. Astin's testimony on this point, but only re-
asserted his position that he kept Mr. Kimber informed. 
Grievant did admit in his own testimony, however, that he did 
not inform anyone of his decision to plead guilty in a plea 
bargain. See R. 402, lines 18-22 
Grievant's testimony that he talked to Mr. Dean Kimber 
about his federal case caused Grievant1s supervisor, Don Avery, 
a certain amount of frustration, as evidenced by Mr. Avery's 
testimony on Rebuttal in the Step 5 hearing: 
Q. Again, what were your instructions to 
Mr. Kent about keeping you informed? 
A. Please, keep me updated on the progress of 
the situation so that I'll know how to 
respond, I'll know how to react, so that 
nothing comes as a surprise to me. 
Q Did you ask him to keep Mr. Kimber informed 
instead of — 
A. No, I did not. I was his immediate 
supervisor. This thing should have been 
handled through me, unless Mr. Kimber had 
told me otherwise and I was not told such. 
R. 414, lines 1-12 
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Mr, Avery explained the impact Grievantfs guilty plea and 
failure to keep Mr. Avery informed had on him and why he 
decided to recommend removal of Grievant from the Contributions 
Section in the following words: 
Q. And why did you make that request? 
A. It was obvious now that I cannot have an 
individual who had pled guilty to a federal 
offense of forgery handling trust fund 
monies. R. 330, line 25 through R. 331, 
line 3 
Q. As far as the ultimate outcome prior to 
August 8 th, did you have any reason to 
believe that Mr. Kent had, in fact, 
committed fraud against the Federal 
Government? 
A. I did not. R. 350, lines 17-21 
Q. And when he pled guilty, how did that 
change your attitude? 
A. I quite honestly felt betrayed. R. 351, 
lines 2-4 
Mr. Avery's testimony immediately following the excerpts 
quoted above went on to explain that the guilty plea and 
failure to keep Mr. Avery informed caused him to lose 
confidence in Grievant. See R. 351, line 8 through R. 352, 
line 4 
Grievant asserts that he had no notice of any 
"professional standards" adopted by the Department. The focus 
of this argument is simply that the Grievant claims he did not 
understand what conduct was expected of him. The Department's 
Supervisor's Handbook is clear and unequivocal about what forms 
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of conduct may be cause for dismissal. The list of causes for 
dismissal clearly includes "Conviction of a crime of moral 
turpitude91. 
Grievant argues that he did not have access to the 
Supervisor's Handbook. He failM in address Mr. Astin's 
testimony that new employees are given information of what 
standards of conduct are expected of them, and that all 
employees have access to the Super vi sor f s Handbook. See 
R. 370, lines 16-25, and [GR. Exh. 1, at R. 1 16] 
In addition, Mr. Avery testified that on more than one 
occasion he advised Grievant that a conviction or guilty plea 
could have an impact on Grievant's job. See R. 319, line 18 
through R. 320, line 5 
All of the foregoing quotations of testimony and 
references to exhibits show that the factual allegations of the 
Department nte supported by substantia.! ijvirt<nce in the tecord. 
Grievant has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate why 
any of the findings of the hearing officer or CSRB are not 
supported b\ the record. Under these circumstances the Court 
should conclude that the findings of fact are correct and 
supported by substantial evidence. 
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POINT III 
THE DECISION TO DISMISS GRIEVANT WAS A REASONABLE 
EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT'S DISCRETION GIVEN THE FACTS 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Grievant argues on appeal that the Department erred in 
dismissing Grievant for three reasons: 1) the Department has 
failed to prove it has adopted objective, identifiable 
professional standards; 2) there is no nexus between Grievant's 
guilty plea and his employment with the Department; and 3) 
Grievant's misconduct occurred while he served in a different 
"office" than the one from which he was dismissed. 
The CSRB hearing officer addressed the first issue, 
whether Grievant violated a known standard of conduct, and 
concluded: 
It seems to be generally understood that an 
employee's reputation for honesty and 
trustworthiness must be without question, 
This is especially true in a sensitive 
position such as Grievant's where trust 
fund moneys are involved. 
Hearing Officer's decision, R. 7. 
The CSRB addressed the same issue in the following manner: 
It is not relevant that Appellant 
[Grievant] had not received a copy of the 
Department's Supervisor Handbook prior to 
his dismissal. Proper conduct and 
professional standards include certain 
moral standards that do not need to be 
explicitly written and disseminated to each 
employee in the public work force. A 
serious offence in criminal law, such as 
forgery, for one who holds a position such 
as an Accountant, a Collections Officer, 
and a Field Auditor, rises to a level of 
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moral turpitude. . . . Clearly a universal 
standard of truthfulness, integrity, 
trustworthiness, and a reputation not 
blemished by an act or acts of forgery may 
be expected of one holding the job title of 
"auditor". . . * 
CSRB Decision, R. 271. 
The Department's policy concerning dismissals for cause is 
clear. It does not conflict with any of the reasons set out in 
the statute. Conviction of a crime of moral turpitude is 
equally as serious if not more so than mere inefficiency or 
failure to maintain skills. It is synonymous with 
incompetency in the sense that by such a conviction one is 
rendered incompetent to perform his duties as such duties 
relate to handling monies t"dc belong lo d tru^t fund, or 
auditing employers for compliance with their legal obligations 
to that trust fund. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"incompetency" as "Lack of ability, legal qualification or 
fitness to discharge the required duty." [Emphasis added.] 
As pointed out by the Arizona Court of Appeals, tue very 
nature of the civil service employer/employee relationship 
makes it infeasible to spell out in detail all conduct which 
will result in discharge. Civil Service Commission of City of 
Tucson v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 525 P.2d 949, cert, 
denied 95 S.Ct.1685, 421 U.S. 951, 44 L.Ed.2d 105 (1974). It 
is sufficient if the employee has fair otic* oJ the employer*s 
policies either expressly, or fairly implied. Ibid. 
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The Department's policy is a matter of record. It is in 
complete conformance with DHRM's policies. 
Concerning Grievant's argument that there is no nexus 
between his misconduct and his job with the Department, the 
Department contends that Grievant's guilty plea to the crime of 
forgery of a U.S. Treasury check, coupled with his failure to 
keep his supervisor informed of the progress of his case, 
caused the Department management to lose confidence in 
Grievant. This is particularly important when an employee 
holds a highly sensitive position that requires unquestioned 
trustworthiness and honesty. Grievant's conduct, both in 
committing the crime of forgery and of failing to keep his 
supervisor informed as instructed, rendered Grievant 
ineffective as an employee. 
As stated by the Department's Administrator in his Step 4 
decision: 
Given the facts of your case, I have no 
alternative but to conclude that your act 
of forgery and failure to communicate 
honestly and openly with your supervisor-
has disabled you from continued 
effectiveness as an employee of the 
Department. 
[Ag. Exh. 1, at R. 175] 
Although Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, supra, 
is not controlling in this case because Grievant herein was not 
a law enforcement officer, there is valuable instruction in 
Despain. For one thing, Grievant as both a Collections Officer 
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and as a Field Auditor, held positions of trust with fiduciary 
responsibilities to a trust fund. In addition, as in Despain, 
Grievant's failure to keep his supervisor informed of the 
status of the federal case against him was "directly relevant 
to the requirements of hi s position", 824 P 2d, at page 447. 
Grievant argues that he cannot be dismissed for conduct 
that occurred prior to his appointment as a Field Auditor. 
This argument is based on the Utah case of State v. Bowen, 62 0 
P.2d 72 (Utah 1980) and other cases cited by Grievant. 
Grievant acknowledges that Bowen and the other cases all 
involved elected officials, whereas Grievant was a State career 
service employee. That distinction is highly significant. 
Grievant's reliance on U.C.A. Section 77-5-1 (1953) is 
misplaced- The dismissal of state career service employees is 
governed by Section 67-19-18. Although the language is similar 
in that both statutes cone] ude wi th the words "I n office", the 
words obviously cannot have the same meaning for a career 
service employee as they do for an elected or appointed 
officer, because the career service employee is not appointed 
for a fixed term. 
A case closely in point was decided by the Court of 
Appeals of Ohi o in 1978. A secretary was hired by the Ohio 
Department of Health as a clerk-typist, Sometime after her 
hire she pled guilty to one count of theft by deception; she 
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had accepted welfare payments to which she was not entitled. 
The court held: 
. . . The phrase "in office" means acts 
which occur while the officer or employee 
in the classified service is employed and 
not such acts occurring before the officer 
or employee becomes employed. 
Craddolph v. Ackerman, 385 N.E.2d 1091, 1093 (Ohio App. 1978). 
The Ohio court also found sufficient nexus existed because the 
secretary's duties included handling confidential medical 
documents, thus requiring honesty and trustworthiness. Id. , 
385 N.E.2d at page 1092. 
In addition, the Administrator's decision relied not only 
on Grievant's conviction as grounds for dismissal, but also on 
Grievant's failure to "communicate honestly and openly" with 
his supervisor. This conduct occurred while Grievant was 
employed as a Field Auditor. Given these facts and 
circumstances, the Department did not abuse its discretion when 
it concluded that Grievant must be dismissed from State 
service. 
CONCLUSION 
Grievant held positions of trust with the Department: 
first as a Collections Officer, and later as a Field Auditor. 
While serving as a Collections Officer Grievant committed the 
crime of forging a U.S. Treasury check. Later, while working 
as a Field Auditor, Grievant pled guilty to a crime of moral 
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turpitude, forgery. Grievant failed to keep his supervisor 
informed of the progress of the criminal case against him, 
despite having been instructed to do so. 
Under these circumstances the Department had no 
alternative but to dismiss Grievant from his employment. The 
decision of the CSRB affirming the Departments decision to 
dismiss Grievant should, itself, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1993. 
K. Allan Zabel 
Attorney for Agency/Respondent 
Department of Employment 
Security 
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63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Administrative Proce-
dures Act." iwi 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except 
as otherwise provided by a statute superseding provi-
sions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chap-
ter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every 
agency of the state of Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the 
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, 
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, 
or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern: 
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency 
rules, or the judicial review of those procedures 
or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in 
the payment of a tax, the decision to waive penal-
ties or interest on taxes, the imposition of, and 
penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance of 
any tax assessment, except that the provisions of 
this chapter govern any agency action com-
menced by a taxpayer or by another person au-
thorized by law to contest the validity or correct-
ness of those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, 
to the granting of pardons or parole, commuta-
tions or terminations of sentences, or to the re-
scission, termination, or revocation of parole or 
probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychi-
atric Security Review Board relating to dis-
charge, conditional release, or retention of per-
sons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline of, 
resolution of grievances of, supervision of, con-
finement of, or the treatment of inmates or resi-
dents of any correctional facility, the Utah State 
Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, 
or persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the 
Division of Mental Health, or persons on proba-
tion or parole, or judicial review of those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, 
employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students 
or teachers in any school or educational institu-
tion, or judicial review of those actions; 
(e) applications for employment and internal 
personnel actions within an agency concerning 
its own employees, or judicial review of those ac-
tions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment 
under Title 35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1973, and Title 58, 
Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act, except that the provisions of this chapter 
govern any agency action commenced by the em-
ployer, licensee, or other person authorized by 
law to contest the validity or correctness of such 
a citation or assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to manage, 
ment of state funds, and contracts for the puj.. 
chase or sale of products, real property, supplie8 
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for 
an agency of the state, except as provided in such 
contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 
1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions, and Title 7, Chapter 2 
Possession of Depository Institution by Commis-
sioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan 
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19 
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or 
Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter 30 
Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review 
of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's el-
igibility for unemployment benefits, the initial 
determination of any person's eligibility for bene-
fits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's Compen-
sation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Law, or the initial de-
termination of a person's unemployment tax lia-
bility; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distri-
bution or award of monetary grants to or be-
tween governmental units, or for research, devel-
opment, or the arts, or judicial review of those 
actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or 
order under Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency 
Medical Services System Act, Title 19, Chapter 5, 
Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air 
Conservation Act, or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except that the 
provisions of this chapter govern any agency ac-
tion commenced by any person authorized by law 
to contest the validity or correctness of any such 
notice or order, 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required 
by federal statute or regulation to be conducted 
according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's 
eligibility for government or public assistance 
benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife li-
censes, permits, tags, and certificates of registra-
tion; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facili-
ties; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chap-
ter 2, Government Records Access and Manage-
ment Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any 
legal remedies otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior 
to the beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the 
presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding 
from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with 
parties and interested persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment if the requirements of Rule 
12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules 
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0f Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, 
except to the extent that the requirements of 
those rules are modified by this chapter. 
ih) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Sec-
tion 63-46b-21 are not governed by this chapter, 
except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings 
authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are governed by 
this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from 
nacting rules affecting or governing adjudicative 
ellceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
ike rules are enacted according to the procedures out-
hned in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the re-
quirements of this chapter. 
(7) If the attorney general issues a written deter-
mination that any provision of this chapter would 
result in the denial of funds or services to an agency 
0f the state from the federal government, the applica-
bility of those provisions to that agency shall be sus-
pended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial. 
The attorney general shall report the suspension to 
the Legislature at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to re-
view final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period pre-
scribed in this chapter, except those time periods es-
tablished for judicial review. 1992 
6346b-2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an 
agency action or proceeding described in Section 
63-46b-l. 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, de-
partment, division, officer, council, office, com-
mittee, bureau, or other administrative unit of 
this state, including the agency head, agency em-
ployees, or other persons acting on behalf of or 
under the authority of the agency head, but does 
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the gover-
nor, any political subdivision of the state, or any 
administrative unit of a political subdivision of 
the state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body 
of individuals in whom the ultimate legal author-
ity of the agency is vested by statute. 
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceed-
ing authorized and governed by Section 
S3-46b-2l. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certi-
fication, approval, registration, charter, or simi-
lar form of authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all re-
spondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all per-
sons authorized by statute or agency rule to par-
ticipate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of in-
dividuals, partnership, corporation, association, 
political subdivision or its units, governmental 
subdivision or its units, public or private organi-
zation or entity of any character, or another 
agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency 
head, or an individual or bodv of individuals 
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compro-
mised, an agency may substitute one presid-
ing officer for another during any proceed-
ing. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding offi-
cer at one phase of a proceeding need not 
continue as presiding officer through all 
phases of a proceeding, 
(i) "Respondent" means a person against 
whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, 
whether by an agency or any other person. 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency re-
quired or authorized by law to review the orders 
of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from 
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency 
head or the presiding officers with responsibility for 
adjudicative proceedings before the agency. isss 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 
63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be com-
menced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are 
commenced by the agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings 
are commenced by persons other than the 
agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and 
served according to the following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writ-
ing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall in-
clude: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all 
persons to whom notice is being given by the 
presiding officer, and the name, title, and 
mailing address of any attorney or employee 
who has been designated to appear for the 
agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other ref-
erence number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceed-
ing; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency ac-
tion was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudica-
tive proceeding is to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or for-
mally according to the provisions of Sections 
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, a statement that each respondent 
must file a written response within 30 days 
of the mailing date of the notice of agency 
action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
formal, or if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, a statement of the time and place of 
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the 
purpose for which the hearing is to be held, 
and a statement that a party who fails to 
attend or participate in the hearing may be 
held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal and a hearing is required by 
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted 
bv rule and mav be requested bv a partv 
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ment that the parties may request a hearing 
within the time provided by the agency's 
rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative 
proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and 
telephone number of the presiding officer; 
and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adju-
dicative proceeding and, to the extent known 
by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided, 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are com-
menced by the agency, the agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each 
party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if 
required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to 
any other person who has a right to notice 
under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency per-
mits persons other than the agency to initiate 
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request 
for agency action shall be in writing and signed 
by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the 
agency, or by his representative, and shall in-
clude: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons 
to whom a copy of the request for agency 
action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other ref-
erence number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency 
action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which agency action is re-
quested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action 
sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons 
forming the basis for relief or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall 
file the request with the agency and shall send a 
copy by mail to each person known to have a 
direct interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or 
more printed forms eliciting the information re-
quired by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the re-
quest for agency action when completed and filed 
by the person requesting agency action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review 
a request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is granted and that the ad-
judicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is denied and, if the proceed-
ing is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that 
the party may request a hearing before the 
agency to challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that fur-
ther proceedings are required to determine 
the agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information re-
quired by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addi-
tion to disclosure required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(ii) of this section. 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice re-
quired by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, ex-
cept that any notice required by Subset 
(3)(d)(iii) may be published when public^0* 
is required by statute. l0& 
(iii) The notice required by Subs*w 
(3)(d)(iii) shall: **** 
(A) give the agency's file number 
other reference number; ** 
(B) give the name of the proceed: 
(C) designate whether the proceed*1*' 
is one of a category to be conducted i* 
formally according to the provision. !!i 
rules enacted under Sections 63-4AWJ 
and 63-46b-5, with citation to the apnT 
cable rule authorizing that designate % 
or formally according to the provision 
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudica. 
tive proceeding, and where respondent 
parties are known, state that a written 
response must be filed within 30 days of 
the date of the agency's notice if mailed, 
or within 30 days of the last publication 
date of the agency's notice, if published: 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in 
an informal adjudicative proceeding 
state the time and place of any sched-
uled hearing, the purpose for which the 
hearing is to be held, and that a party 
who fails to attend or participate in a 
scheduled and noticed hearing may be 
held in default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to 
be informal, and a hearing is required 
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is per-
mitted by rule and may be requested by 
a party within the time prescribed by 
rule, state the parties' right to request a 
hearing and the time within which a 
hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing ad-
dress, and telephone number of the pre-
siding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions 
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judi-
cial review of those initial determinations or actions 
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the re-
quest for agency action seeking review must be filed 
with the agency within the time prescribed by the 
agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceed-
ings, an agency may, by rule, provide for a longer 
response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or per-
mitted by applicable federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or 
order, applications for licenses filed under authority 
of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not considered 
to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is 
to award a license or other privilege as to which there 
are multiple competing applicants, the agency may, 
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative pro-
ceeding to determine the award of that license or 
privilege. 1988 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceed-
ings as formal or informal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories 
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted infor-
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mally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not 
violate any procedural requirement imposed by a 
statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the 
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably pro-
tected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's ad-
ministrative efficiency will be enhanced by cate-
gorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings 
outweighs the potential benefits to the public of a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all 
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically des-
ignated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules 
shall be conducted formally in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any 
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may 
convert a formal ao\judicative proceeding to an infor-
mal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudica-
tive proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the pub-
lic interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 19S7 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or 
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative 
proceedings that include the following: 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and 
requires a response, no answer or other pleading 
responsive to the allegations contained in the no-
tice of agency action or the request for agency 
action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hear-
ing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing 
is permitted by rule and is requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule. 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the 
notice of agency action or in the request for 
agency action shall be permitted to testify, 
present evidence, and comment on the issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely no-
tice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency 
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel 
production of necessary evidence. 
(0 All parties shall have access to information 
contained in the agency's files and to all mate-
rials and information gathered in any investiga-
tion, to the extent permitted by law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the 
agency may enact rules permitting intervention 
where a federal statute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention, 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties, 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of 
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presid-
ing officer shall issue a signed order in writing 
that states the following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties; 
and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review, 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based 
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and 
on the facts presented in evidence at any hear-
ings. 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall 
be promptly mailed to each of the parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
reporter approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script from the agency's record of the hearing. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes 
any investigative right or power given to an agency 
by another statute. 1988 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless 
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), 
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written 
response signed by the respondent or his representa-
tive within 30 days of the mailing date or last date of 
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice 
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference 
number; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respon-
dent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
(e) a statement summarising the reasons that 
the relief requested should be granted. 
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and 
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party. 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, 
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the 
notice of agency action, the request for agency action, 
and the response. All papers permitted or required to 
be filed shall be filed with the agency and one copy 
shall be sent by mail to each party. 198S 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Discovery and sub-
poenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency 
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate 
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant informa-
tion necessary to support their claims or defenses. If 
the agency does not enact rules under this section, 
the parties may conduct discovery according to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the atten-
dance of witnesses or the production of evidence in 
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the 
presiding officer when requested by any party, or 
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own 
motion. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes 
any investigative right or power given to an agency 
by another statute. 1987 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer: 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. Judic ia l review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings . 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal acjjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rui * 
which the agency action is based, is uncongt**? *** 
tional on its face or as applied; ,ttt% l>, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the juri^i 
tion conferred by any statute; "'i^ttc* 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issm* 
requiring resolution; ^* 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted » 
applied the law; °* 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro. -
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed * 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action wer* 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi. 
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facte and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in. 
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, lass 
63-46b-17. Judicial rev iew — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal a4judica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. i987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
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History: C. 1963, 67-19-17, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Grievance and ap-
1979, ch. 139, | 23. peals procedure, dismissal of employee, place-
Meaning of "this act". — See note under ment on reappointment roster at discretion of 
same catchline under 5 67-19-11. board, } 67-19-26. 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disci-
plinary action — Procedure — Reductions in 
force* 
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service employees shall only be to 
advance the good of the public interest, and for such just causes as ineffi-
ciency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance 
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissal for reasons 
of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political affilia-
tion, or other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights under this 
chapter. The director shall promulgate rules governing the procedural and 
documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
(2) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with 
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public 
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal 
to the department head as provided in Subsection (3). 
(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a career service position 
unless the department head or designated representative has observed the 
following procedures: 
(a) The department head or designated representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion; 
(b) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have 
the reply considered by the department head; 
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative; and 
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if 
the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of workload, 
or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters established by the 
director. Under such circumstances: 
(a) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be elimi-
nated, subject to review by the director; 
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before any 
tenured employee; 
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed ac-
cording to rules promulgated by the director allowing appropriate consid-
eration for proficiency and for seniority in state government, including 
any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state 
appointment. Tenured employees shall be separated in the order of their 
retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be discharged 
first; and 
(d) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force 
shall be placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 
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67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disci-
plinary action — Procedure — Reductions in 
force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance 
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incom-
petency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordi-
nation, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, physical 
handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit fac-
tor including the exercise of rights under this chapter, 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural and docu-
mentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with 
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public 
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal 
to the department head as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or dismissed unless the 
department head or designated representative hats complied with this 
subsection. 
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have 
the reply considered by the department head, 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted 
if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of 
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by 
the director. 
(b) Under those circumstances: 
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be 
eliminated, subject to review by the director. 
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated be-
fore any career service employee, 
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order 
of their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to 
be discharged first. 
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be 
computed according to rules established by the director allowing 
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in 
state government, including any active duty military service ful-
filled subsequent to original state appointment, 
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in 
force shall be: 
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsec-
tion 67-19-17(2): and 
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(B) reappointed without examination to anv vn^ a« e v u 
the employee is qualified which occurs within one vl°r IfrtS 
date of the separation. J 0I in 
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may anneal to 
the department head for an administrative review. 
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 workine dava 
after the employee's receipt of written notification of sroaration 
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head 
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L. mer Subsections (a) through (d) as wo^n* <s,.k_ 
1979. ch. 139, 5 24; 1983, ch. 332, 5 9; 1991, sections (b) through (e); in SuWfcm m 
ch. 204, « 6. added the (a), (b), (b)(iv)(A) and CB), and (cXii) 
Amendment Notes.-The 1991 amend- and (iii) designations, added Subsection 
ment, effective Apnl 29, 1991 divided former (b)(iii)(A), and redesignated former S ~ 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1)
 t i o n 8 (a) ^ h {e) „ Subsections frM* 
hrough (3); redesignated former SubsecUons
 m i ) m m m m*) a n d ( x , ™ ^ 
2) through (4) as present Subsections (4)
 a n d m a d c m-nor ^ J J 2 2 S & 
through (6); in Subsection (5), added the Sub-
 c h thro h o u t £ , ^ ^ P ^ a t i o n 
section (a) designation and redesignated for- * * VUt 
67-19-19. Political activity of employees — Rules and regu-
lations — Highway patrol — Hatch Act . 
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules promulgated under this 
section for federally aided programs, the following provisions apply with re-
gard to political activity of career service employees in all grades and posi-
tions. 
(1) State career service employees may voluntarily participate in polit-
ical activity subject to the following provisions: 
(a) if any state career service employee is elected to any partisan 
or full-time nonpartisan political office, that employee shall be 
granted a leave of absence without pay for times when monetary 
compensation is received for service in political office; 
(b) no officer or employee in career service may engage in any 
political activity during the hours of employment, nor may any per-
son solicit political contributions from employees of the executive 
branch during hours of employment for political purposes; and 
(c) partisan political activity may not be a basis for employment, 
promotion, demotion, or dismissal, except that the director shall 
adopt rules providing for the discipline or punishment of a state offi-
cer or employee who violates any provision of this section. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no member 
of the Utah Highway Patrol may use his official authority or influ-
ence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the 
results of an election. 
(b) No person may induce or attempt to induce any member of the 
Utah Highway Patrol to participate in any activity prohibited by this 
subsection. 
(3) Nothing contained in this section may be construed to: 
(a) preclude voluntary contributions by a state employee to the 
partv or candidate nf tV*A nfR^^« — * f % 
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cancy for which the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of 
the date of the separation. 
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the 
department head for an administrative review. The notice of appeal must 
be submitted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt of writ-
ten notification of separation. The employee may appeal the decision of 
the department head according to the grievance and appeals procedure of 
this act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L. act," referred to in the last sentence in Subsec-
1979, ch. 139, 5 24; L. 1983, ch. 332, 5 9. tion (4)(e), literally means Laws 1983, ch. 332, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- §§ 1 to 9, which appear as various sections 
ment deleted "where funds have expired or throughout this chapter (see Table of Session 
work no longer exists" in the first sentence of Laws in Parallel Tables volume). However, 
Subsection (1); deleted "of personnel" after Mdi-
 g i v e n t n e context in which it is used, it seems 
rector" in the last sentence of Subsection (1);
 t h a t t h e ^ ^ ig m e a n t to r e f e r to U w 8 1979> 
deleted "of personnel management after di-
 c h 139> §§ x to 3 5 g ^ n o t e un<Jer g a m e ^ ^ 
rector in Subsection (4); added Subsection
 U n e following 5 6 7 . 1 9 . 1 L 
(4Xe); and made minor changes m phraseology
 Cros8-References. - Grievance and appeal 
"MfiSySftH. «c,». - « . ta. Ihb »"»»*•* • •»•»«• 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d, — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Ser- abolition of public office or employment subject 
vice 55 52 to 90. to civil service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 
A.L.R. — Determination as to good faith in 1166. 
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(b) permit partisan political activity by any state employee who is 
prevented or restricted from engaging in the political activity by the 
provisions of the federal Hatch Act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-19, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 139, ( 25; 1982, ch. 75, i 1; 1984 
(2nd S.S.), ch, 17, 1; 1988, ch. 122, 5 25. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted 
"that employee" for "such employee" in Subsec-
tion (l)(a); substituted "may any person" for 
"shall any person" in Subsection (1Kb); deleted 
"but nothing in this section shall preclude vol-
untary contributions by a state employee to the 
party or candidate of the officer's or employee's 
choice" at the end of Subsection (1Kb); substi-
tuted "may not" for "shall not" in Subsection 
(l)(c); deleted "of the Division of Personnel 
Management" following "director" in Subsec-
tion (l)(c); substituted "adopt rules" for "pro-
mulgate rules" in Subsection (l)(c); designated 
former Subsection (l)(d) as Subsection (2); sub-
stituted "Utah" for "State" before "Highway 
Patrol" in two places in Subsection (2); substi-
tuted "of an election" for "thereof at the end of 
Subsection (2)(a); substituted "by this Subsec-
tion" for "herein" at the end of Subsection 
(2Kb); designated former Subsection (2) as (3); 
substituted "in this section may" for "herein 
shall" at the beginning of Subsection (3); in-i 
serted Subsection (3)(a); inserted subdivision 
designation (b) in Subsection (3); and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public 
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Legislature: An Essay on Separation of 
Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 295 (1988). 
67-19-20 to 67-19-25. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals 
former § 67-19-20, as last amended by Laws 
1983, ch. 301, § 2 and Laws 1983, ch. 320, 
§ 81; and § 67-19-21, as last amended by Laws 
1988, ch. 122, § 26, creating the Personnel Re-
view Board and providing for the submission of 
charges under grievance and appeals proce-
dure, effective April 24, 1989. Laws 1990, ch. 
93, § 41 repeals § 67-19-21.1, as enacted by 
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 284, relating to proce-
dures for adjudicative proceedings, effective 
April 23, 1990. Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 re-
peals §§ 67-19-22 to 67-19-24, as enacted by 
Laws 1979, ch. 139, §§ 28 to 30 and 
§ 67-19-25, as last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 
101, 5 4 and Laws 1988, ch. 122, § 27, concern-
ing grievance and appeals procedure, effective 
April 24, 1989. For present provisions, see 
Chapter 19a of this title. 
67-19-28. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals 
§ 67-19-28, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 139, 
§ 34, providing for the merger of civil service 
systems prior to January 1, 1980. 
67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction. 
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and jurisdictional require-
ments of this section, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance and Appeal Procedures, in seeking reso-
lution of grievances. 
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, 
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, com-
mission, or condition shall be governed by Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, and Title 63, Chapter 46b. Admmistr**ivo P—*<* 
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(3) All grievances involving classification or schedule assignment shall be 
governed by Section 67-19-31 and are designated as informal adjudicative 
proceedings as defined by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act 
(4) All grievances by applicants for positions in state government involving 
an alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice shall be gov-
erned by Section 67-19-32 and Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proce-
dures Act, 
(5) A "grievance" under this chapter is a request for agency action for 
purposes of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-30, enacted by L. The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1989, ch. 191, § 3; 1991, ch. 204, § 6; 1992, 1992, in Subsection (3), substituted "desig-
ch. 193, J L nated as informal adjudicative proceedings as 
Amendment Notes. --The 1991 amend-
 d e f m e d hy» f o r « e x e m p t f r o m t h e procedures 
ment, effective April 29,1991, inserted Gnev- p r 
ance and Appeal Procedures" following 'Title '«-, ,. ~ .
 f i n o n ~, . i A , 
67w in Subsections (1) and (2), "are exempt
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from the procedures of in Subsection (3), and b e c a m e effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
made minor stylistic changes throughout the Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section. 
67-19-31. Classification or position schedule assignment 
grievances — Procedure. 
(1) Upon receipt of a classification or position schedule assignment griev-
ance, the administrator of the Career Service Review Board shall refer the 
grievance to the director. 
(2) (a) The director shall assign the grievance to a classification panel of 
three or more impartial persons trained in state classification procedures. 
(b) The classification panel shall determine whether or not the classifi-
cation assignment was appropriate by applying the statutes, rules, and 
procedures adopted by the department that were in effect at the time of 
the classification or schedule change. 
(c) The classification panel may: 
(i) obtain access to previous audits, classification decisions, and 
reports; 
(ii) request new or additional audits by department or agency per-
sonnel analysts; and 
(iii) consider new or additional information. 
(d) The classification panel may sustain or modify the original decision 
or make a new decision. 
(e) The classification panel shall report its decision and findings to the 
director, who shall notify the grievant 
(3) (a) Either party may appeal the panel's decision to a classification com-
mittee appointed by the director. 
(b) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of 
three or more department directors representing both large and small 
agencies to hear the appeal. 
(c) The classification committee shall review the classification and 
make the final agency decision. The final agency decision is subject to 
judicial review pursuant to the provisions of Section 63-46b-15. 
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10-4.(3) The employee shall agree to repay any such 
assistance which was received for educational work 
completed in the year immediately preceding voluntary 
termination 
10-4.(4) Education assistance shall not exceed $1,500 
in any one fiscal year. Agencies shall have the preroga-
tive of approving program participation of any one 
employee up to and including $1,500, but shall use con-
tract requirements and standards approved by DHRM. 
Agencies which subsidize education of employees 
beyond the $1,500 amount shall receive approval of the 
respective department head. 
10-4.(5) When an agency directs an employee to par-
ticipate in an educational program, then the agency 
shall fully pay the costs thereof. 
KEY: educational tuitions, employee performance evaluation* 
employee productivity, human resource* development, 
personnel management, t raining program! 
1991 67-l5-6<6) 
R477-1L Discipline. 
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion. 
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety 
policies, professional standards adopted by a depart-
ment, work place policies, and such matters as ineffi-
ciency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills, 
adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloy-
alty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfea-
sance, nonfeasance in office, or failure to advance the 
good of the public interest shall be cause for disciplin-
ary action. For purposes of R477-11, employee shall 
mean career service employee unless indicated other-
wise. 
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary 
action taken shall be governed by principles of due pro-
cess which include: 
(l)(a) Consistent application 
(1Kb) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(lXc) Determination of fact 
(1 )(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(IKe) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined 
herein 
11-1.(2) If the agency determines that a career service 
employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive mis-
conduct or that the retention of a career service 
employee would endanger the peace and safety of oth-
ers or pose a grave threat to the public interest, the 
agency, pending an investigation to determine fact 
upon which disciplinary action may be taken, shall uti-
lize one or more of the following options. 
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid adminis-
trative leave (suspension with pay). 
(2Kb) The employee may be temporarily reassigned to 
another position or different work location at the same 
rate of pay pending the completion of the investigation. 
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under Section 
67-19-18(4) the disciplinary process includes the follow-
ing: 
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the 
employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the 
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within 
which to reply and have the reply considered by the 
agency representative before discipline is imposed; 
(3Xc) If an employee waives the right to respond or 
does not reply within the time frames stated in these 
rules or as established by the agency representative, 
whichever is longer, discipline may still be imposed in 
accordance with these rules. 
(3)(d) The employee and the agency representative 
may agree in writing to waive or extend any grievance 
step, or the time limits specified for any grievance step. 
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the 
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been given 
an opportunity to respond and be responded to, disci-
pline may be imposed by the agency representative as 
appropriate. In determining the specific type and sever-
ity of the discipline to be taken, consideration may be 
given to such factors as the severity of the infraction, 
the repeated nature of violations, prior disciplinary/cor-
rective actions, previous oral warnings, written warn-
ings and discussions, the employee's past work record, 
the effect on agency operations, and the potential of the 
violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
Disciplinary action may include one or more of the fol-
lowing options: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand. 
(4Kb) Suspension of the employee without pay up to 
30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the 
following methods as provided by law: 
1) An employee may be moved from a position in one 
class to a position in another class having a lower 
entrance salary if the duties of the position have been 
reduced for disciplinary reasons. 
2) A demotion within the employee's current pay 
range may be accomplished by lowering the employee's 
salary rate back on the range, as determined by the 
department head or designee. 
(4)(d) A department head shall dismiss or demote an 
employee only in accordance with the provision of Sec-
tion 67-19-18 (5). See R477-11-2 of these rules. 
(4Xe) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance 
and appeals procedure as provided by law. 
11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed the 
employee shall be notified in writing of the discipline, 
the reasons for the discipline, the effective date and 
length of the discipline and the standard of conduct nec-
essary to avoid further discipline. 
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion. 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause 
as explained under R477- 10-2 and 11-1 of these rules 
as follows: 
11-2.(1) A department head or appointing officer may 
dismiss an employee having other than career service 
status, without right of appeal, upon providing written 
notification to the employee specifying the reasons for 
the dismissal and the effective date. 
11-2.(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted 
from a career service position unless the department 
head or designee has observed the following procedures 
and the Grievance Procedure Rules: 
(2)(a) The department head or designee shall notify 
•u~ • — • • -
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R137-1-15. Procedure For Grieving Reduction in 
Force. 
Grievances based upon a reduction in force shall be 
governed as follows: 
A. Upon receiving the department head's final written 
decision, the employee may grieve that decision by fil-
ing a written request within 20 working days in the 
CSRB Office. 
B. If timely and properly filed, the grievance shall be 
advanced to the evidentiary level/step 5 at the discre-
tion of the administrator. 
R137-M6. Jurisdict ional Hearings. 
A. Procedural Issues. The administrator is empow-
ered to determine the following: 
1. timeliness, standing, direct harm, jurisdiction, and 
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, as well as any 
other procedural matters to be decided by the adminis-
trator; and 
2. whether an employee has proper standing to pro-
cess a claim. 
B. Determination of Issues. The administrator shall 
determine which issues of a grievance may be heard at 
the evidentiary level. Those issues found to have been 
resolved at a lower level or those that do not qualify for 
advancement to the evidentiary level are precluded 
from further consideration in the grievance procedure. 
C. Preclusion of Issues. Those issues not listed at Sec-
tion 67-19a-302(l) are precluded from advancement to 
the evidentiary level. When the grievance issue is pre-
cluded from the evidentiary level, the matter under dis-
pute shall be deemed as final at the level of the 
department head/step 4 written reply. 
D. Reconsideration. Under Section 63-46M3, a writ-
ten request for reconsideration may be filed with the 
administrator within 30 days after the date that a juris-
dictional hearing decision or an administrative review 
decision is issued. 
E. Judicial Review. The aggrieved employee or the 
agency may appeal the administrator's decision to the 
Court of Appeals within 30 calendar days from the date 
of issuance of a written decision. Any petition for review 
to the Court of Appeals shall be pursuant to Section 63-
46b-16. 
F. Summary Judgment. The administrator may, pur-
suant to an administrative review of the procedural fac-
tors of a grievance case, summarily dispose of such case 
on grounds that: (1) the matter is untimely; (2) the 
grievant has failed to appear at the properly scheduled 
date, time, and place pursuant to written notice; (3) the 
grievant lacks standing; (4) the grievant has with-
drawn or otherwise abandoned his grievance; (5) the 
grievant has not been directly harmed; (6) the issue 
grieved does not qualify to be advanced beyond step 4; 
or (7) the requested remedy or relief exceeds the scope 
of the grievance procedure. 
G. TVanscription and TVanscript Fees. If a party 
appeals a jurisdictional hearing decision to the Court of 
Appeals or to District Court, the appealing party is 
responsible for paying all transcription costs and any 
transcript fees. The CSRB does not participate in the 
payment of such fees when appeals are taken to the 
courts. See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, 
and Utah Cnda ITn««™*of^ C—*:~- *» "t_ «~<~ 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
R137-1-17. Procedural Matters . 
The rules under this section pertain to jurisdictional 
and evidentiary level proceedings of the Career Service 
Review Board, not to appellate proceedings. 
A. Conduct. The purpose of a hearing is to provide a 
fair and impartial opportunity to be heard so that the 
hearing officer may be completely informed in the mat-
ter and enabled to render a proper determination based 
on all the facts and applicable laws and rules. 
B. Formal Adjudication. For purposes of Section 63-
46b-4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, all adjudi-
cative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board 
are to be construed as formal adjudicative proceedings. 
C. Rules of Evidence/Procedure Inapplicable. The 
technical rules of evidence and the formal rules of civil 
procedure as observed in the courts of law are inappli-
cable to grievance procedure proceedings, except for the 
rules of privilege as recognized by law. 
D. Expelling. The hearing officer may clear the pro-
ceeding of witnesses not under examination and may 
exclude any unruly or disruptive person. 
E. Presentation of Case. Each party is given the 
opportunity to make an opening statement prior to pre-
senting its case. At the appropriate time each party is 
given the opportunity to present evidence. After each 
party has presented its respective case, the moving 
party, followed by the responding party, may offer a 
closing statement. Each party may offer a brief rebuttal 
statement in the same order of presentation. Continu-
ous rebuttal is not permissible. 
F. Objections. When an objection is made as to the 
admissibility of evidence, the objection shall be noted 
for the record and a ruling made thereon or taken under 
advisement to be ruled upon later. The hearing officer 
has discretion to exclude inadmissible evidence or to 
order that cumulative evidence be discontinued; parties 
objecting to the introduction of evidence shall state the 
precise grounds of the objection at the time such evi-
dence is offered. 
G. Marking Exhibits. All exhibits shall be numeri-
cally marked in the order that they are received into 
evidence. 
H. Motion to Dismiss. The hearing officer may, upon 
motion of the party present or upon his own motion, dis-
miss the grievance matter with due regard for the stan-
dard of excusable neglect, which standard is for good 
cause shown. 
I. Consolidation of Grievances. Those grievances 
found to be the same or of a sufficiently similar context 
may be consolidated by the administrator for purposes 
of conducting a joint hearing to facilitate economy in 
expenses, time, and witnesses. 
J. Standard of Proof. In all hearings, the standard of 
proof is the substantial evidence standard. 
K. Hearsay Evidence. Hearsay evidence is admissible 
in grievance procedure proceedings pursuant to Section 
63-46b-10(3). 
L. Page Limitation. All written motions, pleadings, 
briefs, and memoranda for all Career Service Review 
Board proceedings shall not exceed 20 typed, double-
spaced 8-V2 x 11 inch pages, exclusive of anv statement 
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page limitation provisions shall be timely filed in writ-
ing, and not in excess of ten double- spaced 8-V2 x 11 
inch pages. The applicant party has the burden to offer 
sufficient justification for requests in excess of 20 and 
10 pages respectively to the Board for the granting of 
any exceptions to the page limitation rule. 
2. The Board shall weigh all requests to exceed the 
page limitation rule based upon the reasonableness 
and necessity of such requests in light of each case and 
its circumstances. The Board may not automatically 
grant exceptions simply on the basis of a request. 
R137-l-ia Witnesses 
A. Availability of State Employees Tb Testify. Every 
agency shall be responsible for making available any of 
its employees who are requested to testify in a hearing 
under these rules. 
1. Off Duty Employees. Agencies are not responsible 
for making available employees who are off duty; on 
sick, annual or other approved leave; or who* for any 
other reason, are not at work during the time the hear-
ing is in progress. 
2. Nondisruption. The parties, their legal representa-
tives, and the administrator shall make every effort 
possible to avoid disruption to the operation of state 
government in the calling of state employees to give tes-
timony in hearings under these rules. 
3. Witness List All parties to a proceeding are to sub-
mit prior to the proceeding a list of witnesses expected 
to be called. This list is to be provided to all parties of 
record, and a copy is to be filed with the administrator. 
The witness list is to be offered at the prehearing con-
ference. 
4. Witness Failure. If a requested witness does not 
appear at the scheduled hearing, such failure to appear 
shall not necessitate the postponement of any proceed-
ings. 
5. Excessive Witnesses. If the number of witnesses 
requested seems excessive, the requesting party maybe 
directed by the administrator to justify the request. 
6. Witness Fees/State Employees. A witness fee is 
available to state employees who utilize nonworking 
hours and whose presence is required in a grievance 
procedure proceeding. 
B. Hostile Witnesses. If a hearing officer determines 
that a witness is hostile or uncooperative, the witness 
may be examined by the party calling him as if under 
cross-examination. The party calling the witness may, 
upon showing that the witness was called in good faith 
but that the testimony is a surprise, proceed to impeach 
the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements. 
C. Exclusion/Sequestering Rule. The hearing officer 
may order that witnesses in any hearing be excluded, 
that is sequestered, so as to preclude any witness, other 
than the parties and their representatives, from hear-
ing the testimony of any other witness. Witnesses not 
presently testifying may be excluded on motion by one 
or both parties. Witnesses are to be counseled not to dis-
cuss the case with other witnesses. 
D. Management Representative. Prior to every hear-
ing the agency's adjudicatory spokesman shall desig-
nate a management representative who is entitled to 
remain throughout the hearing to represent the agency 
at any proceeding. The grievant and the management 
representative may not be excluded from the heai ing. 
E. Witness Fees/Nonstate Employees. A nonsta 
employee called as a witness to a Career Servi< 
Review Board hearing shall be paid the same fee ar 
mileage reimbursement that is paid to a witness i 
Utah's inferior courts. 
R137-M9. Public Hearings. 
The parties shall be entitled to an open and publi 
hearing unless the exclusionary rule is invoked c 
unless there are reasonable grounds to justify an exec 
utive session. 
A. Closing Hearings. All grievance procedure heai 
ings shall be open to the public, except for situations i; 
which the administrator, the board, or the hearin 
officer closes by executive session either a portion of th 
hearing or the entire hearing when substantial reasoi 
exists for not having an open hearing. 
1. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing may be closed in par 
or in its entirety when the proceeding involves ques 
tions about an employee's character, professional com 
petence, or physical or mental health. 
2. Authority to close meetings is set forth in the Utal 
Open and Public Meetings Act, Section 52-4-5(1). 
B. Sealing Evidence. The administrator, the board, 01 
the hearing officer may exercise authority to seal the 
record when circumstances so warrant. 
C. Media Presence. All hearings at the evidentiary; 
step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels are open to the media, 
unless otherwise closed due to R137-1-19A above, 
except that television cameras shall not be permitted at 
the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings. 
D. Dissemination. The administrator has discretion 
to release copies of legal decisions, orders, and rulings 
to a media representative upon the latter's request. 
Portions of or entire legal decisions and orders may be 
withheld if deemed to be of a privileged or confidential 
nature, or if the record is sealed. 
R137-1-20. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings. 
A. Authority of Hearing Officers. The hearing officer 
is empowered to: 
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear 
and complete record, rule upon offers of proof, and 
receive relevant evidence; 
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative 
testimony and exclude any witness whose later testi-
mony might be colored by the testimony of another wit-
ness or any person whose presence might have a 
chilling effect on another testifying witness; 
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed find-
ings; 
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the pre-
sentation of oral argument with respect to any question 
of law; 
5. compel testimony and order the production of evi-
dence and the appearance of witnesses; and 
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative 
value. 
B. Conduct of Hearings. A hearing shall be confined to 
those issues related to the subject matter presented in 
the original grievance statement. 
1. An evidentiary proceeding shall not be allowed to 
develop into a general inquiry into the policies and 
operations of an agency. 
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the 
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purpose of receiving evidence which either refutes or 
substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall not be 
made an occasion for irresponsible accusations, general 
attacks upon the character or conduct of the employing 
agency or the employee or others, or for making derog-
atory assertions having no bearing on the claims or spe-
cific matters under review. 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 
hearing shall be a new hearing for the record, with both 
parties being accorded full administrative due process. 
The hearing officer shall give latitude and consider-
ation to an agency's prior decision when the latter is 
supported by the findings of fact based on the evidence. 
D. Discretion. Upon commencement, the hearing 
officer shall announce that the hearing is convened and 
is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall 
note appearances for the record and shall determine 
which party has the burden of moving forward. 
E. Closing of the Record. After all testimony, docu-
mentary evidence, and arguments have been pre-
sented, the hearing officer shall close the record and 
terminate the proceeding, unless one or both parties 
agree to submit a posthearing brief within a specified 
time. 
F. Posthearing Briefs. When posthearing briefs or 
memoranda of law are scheduled to be submitted, the 
record shall remain open until the briefs are received by 
the hearing officer and incorporated into the record, or 
until the time to receive such briefs has expired. Alter 
receipt of posthearing documents, or upon the expira-
tion of the time to receive posthearing documents, the 
case is then taken under advisement, and the tolling 
period commences for the issuance of the written deci-
sion. 
G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Following 
the closing of the record, the hearing officer shall make 
and enter a written decision containing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The decision and order is filed 
with the administrator and without further action 
becomes the decision and order of the evidentiary hear-
ing. 
H. Disseminating Decisions. The administrator shall 
disseminate copies of the decision and order to the per-
sons of record for each party. 
I. Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a 
disciplinary penalty is at issue, the past employment 
record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either 
mitigating or sustaining the penalty in the event that 
the employee is found guilty of the disciplinary charge 
alleged. 
J. Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds 
that the action complained of which was taken by the 
appointing authority was too severe, even though for 
good cause, the hearing officer may provide for such 
other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the 
best interest of the respective parties. 
K. Compliance and Enforcement. State agencies and 
officials are expected to comply with decisions and 
orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is 
taken to the appellate/step 6 level. Enforcement mea-
sures available to the board include: (1) involving the 
governor, who may remove most state officers with or 
without cause, and with respect to those who can only 
damus order to compel the official to obey the order; and 
(3) the charge of a Class A misdemeanor. 
L. No Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted. 
M. Reconsideration. A request for a reconsideration 
may be made in writing within ten working days after 
the date that an evidentiary/step 5 decision is received 
by the party. The written request is to contain specific 
reasons as to why a reconsideration is warranted with 
respect to the factual findings and conclusions of the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision. The original hearing officer 
shall decide on the propriety of a reconsideration. A 
request for reconsideration is filed with the administra-
tor. Any appeal to the board from a reconsideration by 
the original hearing officer must be filed with the 
administrator within ten working days upon receipt of 
the reconsideration. 
R 1 3 7 - 1 - 2 1 . T h e B o a r d and t h e A p p e l l a t e 
Procedure. 
A. TVanscript Production. The party appealing the 
hearing officer's decision to the board at the appellate/ 
step 6 level shall order production of the evidentiary/ 
step 5 proceeding's transcript from the court reporter. 
The appellant shall share an equal payment with the 
CSRB Office to the court reporting firm. 
1. TVanscript production cost-sharing applies only to 
the appellant and to the CSRB Office. The former 
receives the transcript original; the latter receives a 
transcript copy. 
2. The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office 
about obtaining a transcript copy, or may directly pur-
chase a copy from the court reporting firm. 
B. Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board is based 
upon the evidentiary record previously established by 
the hearing officer. No additional or new evidence is 
permitted unless compelled by the board. 
1. The appellant in a step 6 proceeding must obtain 
the transcript of the step 5 hearing. After receipt of the 
transcript, the appellant has a ten working-day period 
to file six copies of a brief with the administrator. Addi-
tionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of 
the appellant's brief. 
2. Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the 
respondent then has a ten working-day period to file six 
copies of a reply brief with the administrator. 
3. Briefs are distributed to board members upon 
receipt from both parties. 
4. All briefs shall be hand delivered, sent by the U.S. 
Postal Service postage prepaid, or sent through the 
state's Central Mailing. 
5. Briefs shall be date-stamped upon receipt in the 
CSRB Office. 
6. The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modi-
fied or waived only for good cause as determined by the 
administrator. 
C. Rules of Procedure. The following rules are appli-
cable to appeal hearings before the board: 
1. Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party 
or upon its own motion, the board may dismiss any 
appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the 
appeal is clearly moot, without merit, not properly filed, 
or not within the scope of the board's authority. 
2. Notice. Written notice of the date, time, place, and 
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
140 East 300 South • P.O. Box 11249 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0249 
(801)536-7400 
FAX (801) 536-7420 
December 3, 1991 
Charles D. Kent 
Contributions & Collections 
Dear Charles: 
Disciplinary Decision 
On October 4, 1991, Mr. Don Avery, Chief of Contributions, issued to you 
a Notification of Intent to Discipline, in which he advised you of his intent to recommend 
that you be disciplined by dismissal from this Department. You responded on October 23, 
1991. On October 30,1991, Mr. Avery advised you that he had considered your response 
and felt it necessary to recommend to the Administrator that you be dismissed from state 
service. 
Upon receipt of Mr. Avery's recommendation of disciplinary action and your 
prior response to his intent letter, I carefully reviewed the information in both documents. 
You were subsequently notified that I would conduct a hearing on this matter on Friday, 
November 15, 1991. The hearing was held beginning at 2:00 p.m. 
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed from the 
Department and state service to advance the good of the public interest for noncompliance 
with professional standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you be 
dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude while employed by the 
Department? 
Based on the information contained in Mr. Avery's Notification of Intent to 
Discipline and Recommendation for Disciplinary Action, and the additional information 
provided by you and Mr. Avery at the hearing, I hereby make the following: 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about May 1, 1991, your supervisor, who at the time was Mr. Don 
Avery, learned that you had been indicted by a Grand Jury for the crime of 
7orm 702 
J0B*i 
SERVICE *3 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Floyd G. Astin 
Administrator 
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forgery. The charge arose from an allegation that you had forged the 
endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a United States Treasury check. Charles 
L. Kent was your father. Mr. Kent had resided in your home for several years 
prior to his death. 
2. When Mr. Avery asked you about your indictment, you advised him that you 
were innocent. You were temporarily reassigned to non-audit work within 
the Field Audit Unit until the indictment was cleared. 
3. At the time Mr. Avery learned of your indictment, he asked you to keep him 
informed of the progress of your case because of the serious nature of the 
charges. 
4. On August 8,1991 you appeared before Judge David K. Winder in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, case number 91-NCR-34W, at 
which time you entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge of forgery. 
5. You did not communicate with Mr. Avery either before or after August 8, 
1991, about your guilty plea, until Mr. Avery asked you about it. 
6. On November 1, 1991, you were sentenced to five years of probation, 
ordered to make restitution in the amount of over $18,000, and fined for the 
crime of forgery. 
Reasoning and Decision 
The Department's Supervisor's Handbook (1990 edition, page 12-2) states 
that an employee may be dismissed if he is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. The 
classification specification for the position of Field Auditor requires a Field Auditor to 
perform audits and investigations of employers and collect contributions, interest and 
penalties from employers. These functions have direct effect on the Unemployment 
Insurance Trust Fund. Employees who handle Trust Fund monies and audit employers 
must have high reputations of honesty and trustworthiness. 
In our hearing you presented the defense that you are innocent of the charge 
of forgery, and that you only pled guilty on the advice of your attorney. You stated that 
you learned five years after your father's passing that his Social Security checks had been 
coming to your home. You further stated that you believe your brother may have forged 
the Social Security checks during all that time. 
A plea of guilty is the equivalent of a conviction. Although you state that you 
are innocent, I am bound by what happened in criminal court. In addition, I find it very 
difficult to believe that your father's Social Security checks could come to your home for 
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a five-year period and that you had absolutely no knowledge of the matter. Concerning 
your belief that your brother may have forged the checks, you stated yourself that the 
federal handwriting expert expressed the opinion that your brother could not have done 
the forgery. 
Perhaps equally important as your guilty plea was the fact that you failed to 
keep Mr. Avery informed of the progress of your case. You stated in the hearing that you 
didn't talk to Mr. Avery about your decision to plead guilty because a Department 
employee was in court when you entered your plea and you concluded that Mr. Avery 
would be told about it. 
This failure to communicate occurred even though you were given specific 
instruction on the matter. In view of the instruction you were given and the importance 
of the matter to your job, I find it particularly difficult to understand why you would plead 
guilty to forgery without letting your supervisor or the Chief of Contributions know your 
intent. Your lack of communication and false denial on a matter so vital to both you and 
the Department naturally has caused management of this Department to lose confidence 
and trust in you. 
Given the facts of your case, I have no alternative but to conclude that your 
act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with your supervisor has 
disabled you from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department. Therefore, 
you are to be dismissed from the Department and state service for the good of the public 
interest pursuant to Section 67-19-18(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Your 
dismissal shall be effective at the close of business December 6, 1991. 
If you disagree with this decision, you have 20 working days from the date 
hereof to file a grievance with the Career Service Review Board in accordance with its 
rules. You may contact Mr. Doug Olsen of this Department's Personnel Section or the 
Career Service Review Board, Room 1120, State Office Building, for further information 
concerning your right to grieve this decision. 
Sincerely, 
ld/PC3 
CDKDSSML 
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his supervisor as an equally important cause for dismissal. 
Grievant asserted that there were no specific rules of professional conduct delineated 
in the Department's rules and regulations and that, therefore, it was an error for the 
Department to cite the violation of professional policies as a reason for discipline. The 
Administrator testified, however, that he feels there is certain professional conduct that is 
"understood" in general by employees in positions such as Grievant's. It seems to be 
generally understood that an employee' s reputation for honesty and trustworthiness must 
be without question. This is especially true in a sensitive position such as Grievant' s when 
trust fund moneys are involved. 
Grievant's supervisor and the Administrator testified that they considered the 
alternative of transferring Grievant to a different position where the issue of honesty and 
trustworthiness would not be so critical, but that another position was not available. 
In summation, the Agency determined that Grievant' s credibility had been damaged 
by his guilty plea and by his failure to communicate about the indictment process. It also 
determined that his conduct had constituted a violation of certain "understood" policies of 
professional conduct. The Agency further determined that it had lost confidence in 
Grievant's ability to function effectively in his present position, and that a realistic 
opportunity for transfer did not exist 
Taken altogether, these determinations constitute a finding that substantial evidence 
exists to support Agency's decision to discipline Grievant. The Agency followed its own 
policies by holding a hearing for Grievant, and it exercised its discretion reasonably by 
determining, from the hearing, that "adequate cause" existed for discipline. 
C. Time Period of GHevant' s Actions 
Grievant asserts that the actions for which he was disciplined did not occur while he 
was in his current position, so that he should not properly have been disciplined for them. 
While it is true that the forgery occurred while he was in a former position, the guilty plea 
and the failure to communicate with his supervisor did occur while he was in his current 
position. The actions that led to the finding of "adequate cause or reason" occurred in a 
relevant and reasonable time period and were properly used as the basis for discipline. 
D. Nexus Requirement 
Grievant properly asserted that the Department has the burden to show the nexus 
between Grievant' s misconduct and its detrimental effect on his job performance that would 
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A reduction in force is governed by the Department's work force adjustment plan. A copy of the plan 
will be available to all affected staff when reductions are necessary. 
Retention points shall be calculated on all career employees by the length of continuous State service 
and a job proficiency score. An average of the last three annual performance ratings will be used as a 
proficiency score. When less than three ratings are available the average of those given will be used. Each 
employee's job proficiency score and length of service score shall be added together to produce the 
retention score. 
The order of separation will be first temporary employees (TLNC), second probal ionary, and third 
tenured employees in order of their retention scores. In cases of a tie, the employee with the least seniority 
shall be released first. 
Employees who are separated due to a reduction in force shall be given written notification of 
separation. They may appeal to the Administrator for review if the appeal is submitted within 10 working 
days from receipt of their written notification. The employee may appeal the Administrator's decision 
according to the appeal procedure of the Career Service Review Board. 
A reinstated nf d employee is not required to serve a probationary period and enjoys the rights and 
privileges of a regular career service employee. 
Dismissals for Cause 
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period. 
Failure to report to work. 
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties. 
Violation of Department or State regulations. 
Gross misconduct or insubordination. 
Written notification from the Administrator specifying the reasons for the dismissal, and the effective 
date, must be given the employee. 
The following procedures must be observed in dismissing or demoting employees having career 
service status: 
1. The Administrator or designated representative shall notify the employee in writing of the 
reasons for the dismissal (or demotion). 
2. The employee shall have at least five working days to reply and have the reply c onsidered by the 
Administrator. 
3. The employee shall have the right to be heard by the Administrator or representative. 
4. Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the Administrator finds 
adequate cause or reason. 
5. The Administrator may suspend an employee without pay pending the outcome of dismissal 
proceedings. 
12-2 
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Form 70J 5£BWCf i 
ut*D«,**nt«, Don Avery 
of£mpioym*ntsecurity c h i e f of C o n t r i b u t i o n s 
Qntercffice Commtmicafion Cleared for Release: 
Date- September 13, 1991 
ft 
TO: Terry Burns, UI Director 
SUBJECT: Charles Kent 
On May 1, 1991, I learned from a local office acquaintance 
that Charles had been indicted by a federal grand jury of 
fraudulently endorsing 10 US Treasury checks. The next day I 
discussed this with him and he assured me that he was not guilty. 
He explained that his brother who had been living with him had 
committed the forgery. 
Charles has been under closer supervision since then and 
will continue to be until the issue is resolved. His duties have 
be^n restricted in order to reduce his handling of trust fund 
mo ies. During this time Charles has repeatedly told me that he 
wa not the guilty party, and that his attorney has assured him 
he had nothing to worry about. 
Now that he has pleaded guilty to the charges, I am 
concerned about Charles1 continued employment in Field Audit. On 
September 9 I again discussed the situation with him. He still 
contends to be innocent and the only reason he pleaded guilty was 
upon the advice of his attorney. His attorney counseled him that 
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor should have no consequences upon 
his current employment. I disagree. Criminal forgery of any 
type, regardless of the degree of the crime, cannot be overlooked 
when considering the integrity of our auditors. I do not believe 
that it is in his or the agencyfs best interest to keep him 
working in Field Audit or Contributions. I do not want him in 
any position where there is the potential of handling or 
manipulating trust fund monies. 
If his offense does not justify termination, I request that 
he be transferred elsewhere in the department. Your 
consideration in this matter is appreciated. 
DA/gb 
KENT.MEM 
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Interoffice Communication 
Prepared by: 
Vince Iturbe 
Benefit Paymemt 
Cleared for Release 
p^ CSRB Grievant Exhibit* 1 
August 8, 1991 
TO: Terry Burns, Director, Unemployment Insurance 
SUBJECT: Charles D. Kent 
On Thursday, August 8, at 9:00 a.m., I attended the 
United States District Court, District of Utah, in regards to 
Charles D. Kent. A change of plea was introduced to Judge David 
Winder. The attorney for the United States Government was Mr. 
Gilson, the attorney for the defense was Mr. Bennett. A plea 
bargain was entered into whereas the original ten counts of 
misuse of Social Security funds involving the forging of United 
States Treasury checks was to be changed from a felony to a 
misdemeanor. 
The plea bargain would involve full restitution of 
$18,287. At the time of sentencing $3,000 is to be paid, and 
during a probationary period the remaining $15,287 is to be 
paid, plus interest. The probation period will be established 
by the judge. Mr. Kent is being charged with forging the 
signature of his deceased father, Mr. Charles L. Kent; therefore, 
defrauding the United States Government. 
The judge made it clear that he would take this matter 
under advisement, but is not held to any plea bargain. The judge 
can still sentence Mr* Kent on the felony charge. The date for 
sentencing is November 1, 1991, at 8:00 a.m. in the United States 
District Court, District of Utah, 350 South Main, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
If there are any additional questions, please feel free 
to contact me at 533-2081. 
Vl/jat 
cc: Evan Mattinson 
Don Avery 
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M DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Norman H. B*ngert«r 140 East 300 South • PO. Box 11249 
Governor 3 ^
 U k # ^ y ^ 54^7^249 
Floyd G. Aatin (801) 536-7400 
Administrator FAX (601) 536-7420 
December 3, 1991 
Charles D. Kent 
Contributions & Collections 
Dear Charles: 
Disciplinary Decision 
On October 4, 1991, Mr. Don Avery, Chief of Contributions, issued to you 
a Notification of Intent to Discipline, in which he advised you of his intent to recommend 
that you be disciplined by dismissal from this Department. You responded on October 23, 
1991. On October 30,1991, Mr. Avery advised you that he had considered your response 
and felt it necessary to recommend to the Administrator that you be dismissed from state 
service. 
Upon receipt of Mr. Avery's recommendation of disciplinary action and your 
prior response to his intent letter, I carefully reviewed the information in both documents. 
You were subsequently notified that I would conduct a hearing on this matter on Friday, 
November 15, 1991. The hearing was held beginning at 2:00 p.m. 
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed from the 
Department and state service to advance the good of the public interest for noncompliance 
with professional standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you be 
dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude while employed by the 
Department? 
Based on the information contained in Mr. Avery's Notification of Intent to 
Discipline and Recommendation for Disciplinary Action, and the additional information 
provided by you and Mr. Avery at the hearing, I hereby make the following: 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about May 1, 1991, your supervisor, who at the time was Mr. Don 
Avery, learned that you had been indicted by a Grand Jury for the crime of 
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a five-year period and that you had absolutely no knowledge of the matter. Concerning 
your belief that your brother may have forged the checks, you stated yourself that the 
federal handwriting expert expressed the opinion that your brother could not have done 
the forgery. 
Perhaps equally important as your guilty plea was the fact that you failed to 
keep Mr. Avery informed of the progress of your case. You stated in the hearing that you 
didn't talk to Mr. Avery about your decision to plead guilty because a Department 
employee was in court when you entered your plea and you concluded that Mr. Avery 
would be told about it. 
This failure to communicate occurred even though you were given specific 
instruction on the matter. In view of the instruction you were given and the importance 
of the matter to your job, I find it particularly difficult to understand why you would plead 
guilty to forgery without letting your supervisor or the Chief of Contributions know your 
intent. Your lack of communication and false denial on a matter so vital to both you and 
the Department naturally has caused management of this Department to lose confidence 
and trust in you. 
Given the facts of your case, I have no alternative but to conclude that your 
act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with your supervisor has 
disabled you from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department. Therefore, 
you are to be dismissed from the Department and state service for the good of the public 
interest pursuant to Section 67-19-18(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Your 
dismissal shall be effective at the close of business December 6, 1991. 
If you disagree with this decision, you have 20 working days from the date 
hereof to file a grievance with the Career Service Review Board in accordance with its 
rules. You may contact Mr. Doug Olsen of this Department's Personnel Section or the 
Career Service Review Board, Room 1120, State Office Building, for further information 
concerning your right to grieve this decision. 
Sincerely, 
ld/PC3 
CDKDSSML 
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MINUTES OF TOE UNITED STATES DISTRiqjWUR 'r R THE DISTRICT OF UTAH """ ff ^ 
_CENTRAL DIVISION ^ ^ f c
 m CIVIL HEAiw,,. 
# 
_NORTHERN DIVISION c\G^9 \ f l \ ^ X CRIMINAL HEARING 
^ P ^ V DATE M™~rf~,- 1, 1QQ1 
CASE NO. 9 1 NCR 34 W U.S .A . VS CHARLES D. KENT 
HON. ALDCN J . ANDERSON HON. BRUCE S . JENKINS X HON. DAVID K. WINDER 
HON. J . THOMAS GREENE HCN DAVID SAM 
DEPUTY CLERK Deana H. S c o t t COURT REPORTERS Ray Fenlon 
tpf 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
Jan*?? gJlSQn. AVSA Wfinrfell tenngtfr 
Ronald QMifig, ProfraUOT QtflVtt 
CALENDARED FOR* IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE 
Statements were made by Mr. Bennett, Mr. Kent and Mr. Gilson. Inposition of sentence 
was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for a period of five years. All 
of the usual conditions of probation apply, including the following: 
1. Not violate any laws, federal, state or local. 
2. Report fully and ccnpletely with the Probation Office when they direct hixn to report, 
3. Make restitution in the sum of $18,207.00, $3,000.00 of that amount is to be paid 
within ten days from today, the balance of $15,207.00 plus interest at the rate of 5.42% 
•^over a term of five years while he is on probation. 
4. Pay fine of $2,000.00, to be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month, in addition to 
the restitution, for a period of forty months. The money being timely paid is a 
condition of the defendant being out of prison. 
5. Financial records are to be made available to the Probation Office, when requested. 
6. Pay $25.00 assessment fee. 
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Utah Department
 # „ ^0* 4u-w*j 
of Employment security chief of Contr ibut ions 
9ntatff/ice Gornminucatkm Cleared for Release: 
Date: 0 c t d b e r 4' 1 9 9 1 
TO: Charles D. Kent, Field Auditor 
SUBJECT: Notification of Intent to Discipline 
You are notified of my intent to recommend to the 
Administrator that you be disciplined through dismissal from this 
agency* 
You are advised of this disciplinary action "to advance the 
good of the public interest" [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R468-11-
1.3(a), and pursuant to the following under R468-11.1 for 
noncompliance with professional standards adopted by this 
Department. The specific reasons for ray intent to impose this 
disciplinary action are: 
On August 8, 1991 you appeared before Judge David K. Winder 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
case number 91-NCR-34W, and entered a plea of guilty to forging 
the endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a United States Treasury 
check. 
Since May 1# 1991 when I learned of your indictment, you 
have assured me of your innocence. I asked you to keep me 
apprised of the progress of your case, but at no time did you 
voluntarily do so. I repeatedly had to request status reports 
from you. You also failed to inform me of your August 8 court 
appointment and your intentions to plead guilty. During this 
entire period your actions have been less than helpful and your 
intent misleading. 
Contributions employees, especially those handling Trust 
Fund monies, must have reputations for honesty and 
trustworthiness which are unquestionable. It is not in the best 
interest of this Department to have you working in such a 
responsible position as that of a Field Auditor subsequent to 
yc^ ur admission of guilt to a criminal act of forgery. 
JCY\ UUjLgAx* Don Avery, Chief of Contributions 
I have read this notice of intent to discipline. I 
understand that I have the right to be heard and have until 
October £3 , 1991 in which to respond in writing to the author of 
this letter. 
-I^b*** rQ#£ Charles D. Kent Date SO- 7' 91 
DA/gb 
KENT1.MEM 
loyee /arestxmded in writinct 10-23-91. ^ a S e 
J0v\ (AA4AA , Do" Avery, Chief of Contributions Date j£-2 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
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ACCOUNTANT 17 EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 27, 1969 
POSITION SUMMARY: Under the general supervision of an Accountant Supervisor, 
performs a variety of duties related to field auditing. Audits employer records 
to reconcile them with contribution reports* Collects delinquent contributions, 
Interest levies, and penalty assessments. Conducts the Department's biennial 
status survey. Serves legal papers as required. Performs related duties as 
assigned. 
EXAMPLES OF WORK PERFORMED: 
1. Audits employer records to reconcile them with contribution reports. 
Conducts audit at the location where the records are kept. Audits 
payrolls, State and Federal tax returns, general ledger accounts 
and other records. In case of discrepancies, computes amounts due, 
determines interest, and collects or arranges for payment, or 
certifies entitlement to refund if applicable. Checks weeks worked 
and wages paid to verify eligibility of claimants for Unemployment1 
Insurance. Instructs employers in the proper filing of reports* 
Conducts special audits of employer records In cases of known or 
suspected violations or misinterpretations of the Act. 
2. Collects delinquent contributidns, interest levies and penalty assess* 
ments. Makes collection at the time of contact with employer, 
arranges for payment at a later date, or conducts an Inventory as 
a preliminary step in planning the legal seizure and liquidation 
of assets to satisfy the amount due. Researches various public and 
private documents in an effort to locate employers attempting to 
evade payment. Conducts Investigations to locate hidden assets 
when necessary. Makes collections for other states under a recip-
rocal agreement. 
3. Conducts the Department's biennial status survey. Contacts persons 
or companies who may be employing others to determine if they are 
subject employers as defined by the Employment Security Act. Con-
tacts employers on an area basis. Personally visits new businesses 
and checks other accounts if there appears to be a change in status. 
Interviews employers, gathers facts and audits records. Fills out 
proper forms and sets up accounts when indicated. Computes contri-
bution amounts due, interest, and penalties where required. 
4. Serves legal papers as required. Receives warrants, garnishments, 
executions, summons, court orders and subpoenas for service in Salt 
Lake County. Files them with County Clerk's Office. 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS: 
1. Education and Experience 
(a) Graduation from an accredited 4-year college or university, incl Page #181 
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Doc. No. 2 
Arc, No. 
STATE OF UTAH DIVISION OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
APPROVED CLASS SPECIFICATIONS 
Class Title and Grade: Field Auditor 21 Range: 0112 Class Code: 
1362 Effective Date: 9-1-82 OT Code: STO EE0Code7 2 
Distinguishing Characteristics: 
This is a working level class with a probationary period of 6 months. 
Under general direction performs a variety of professional field 
auditing duties in the Utah Department of Employment Security. 
Employees in this class perform specialized auditing, investigating, 
collecting and related field duties under very limited supervision. 
They make appointments and schedule time according to assignment 
requirements. These employees have a working knowledge of the 
Employment Security Act, its related regulations and precedent cases. 
They serve legal papers and make determinations of wage credits for the 
claims section. They perform difficult auditing functions on extended 
field trips and contact employer and government representatives, lawyers 
and accountants on a regular basis 
Examples of Work: (These are intended as general illustrations of the 
work in this class and are not all inclusive for specific positions) 
Contacts employers to administer and enforce provisions of the 
Employment Security Act; gathers information, discusses findings and 
gives advice and instructions; examines and audits employer accounting 
records and other supporting documents to determine compliance with the 
Employment Security Act, rules and regulations, and judicial precedent; 
reconciles and corrects reports; locates and contacts employers to 
effect the collection of delinquent reports and contributions; 
interviews neighbors and various witnesses to trace employers who have 
moved; discusses accounts receivable with employers and arranges payment 
schedules for those in financial difficulty; performs investigations to 
determine the Unemployment Insurance tax status of new and existing 
employers; may examine records and documents as well as interview 
various employer representatives to establish employer subjectivity and 
liability; contacts employers, accountants, and others to determine wage 
data of claimants or to verify previously submitted wage information; 
audits employer and claimant records to investigate suspected fraud; 
seeks evidence of willful misrepresentation or collusion between 
claimants and employers; may be assigned periodic field trips into the 
outlying areas of the State; may investigate various governmental 
entities to determine their status under the Employment Security Act; 
may act in liaison with the Internal Revenue Service, the State Tax 
Commission and other governmental agencies in obtaining information to 
be used in the administration of the Act; performs other duties as 
assigned. 
Qualifications Statement: 
A. Knowledges, Skills, and Abilities 
a—i 1
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duties. By his failure to keep Avery informed of his judicial status as directed, and by his 
later plea bargain (openly acknowledging his guilt to fraud), Kent breached the level of 
confidence and trust which the Department's officials had placed in him. Due to Kent's 
fiduciary capacity, this breach of confidence and trust constituted aggravated misconduct. 
Therefore, the Department was justified in dismissing Kent in order to advance the good 
of the public interest pursuant to §67-19-18(1). 
4. The Departmentf s Supervisor Handbook lists as a cause for dismissal: "Conviction 
of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4.) Appellant, who was 
not a supervisor or manager, had not received a copy of the handbook during his years of 
employment with the Department. Appellant averred that he had no knowledge of these 
professional standards prior to dismissal proceedings (T. 105). Admittedly, this handbook 
does not apply the term "professional standards," but it explicitly sets forth several grounds 
as dismissal for cause, including a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. Human 
Resource Management Rules (July 1991 edition), at R468-11-1, states in part: 
"Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety policies, professional standards 
adopted by a department, work place policies,... failure to advance the good of the public 
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision of the 
Human Resource Management Rules is applicable to all career service employees, including 
Kent, regardless of whether one has personal knowledge of the rule or not. There are 
certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, which need not be 
written into an employer• s policies and work place rules. The public employing agency may 
reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten universal moral standards, which if breached, 
would substantially tarnish an employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the 
employment relationship. 
5. It is not relevant that Appellant had not received a copy of the Department' s 
Supervisor Handbook prior to his dismissal. Proper conduct and professional standards 
include certain moral standards that do not need to be explicitly written and disseminated 
to each employee in the public work force. A serious offense in criminal law, such as 
forgery, for one who holds a position such as an Accountant, a Collections Officer, and a 
Field Auditor rises to a level of moral turpitude. The standard of moral turpitude need not 
be written as a specific agency policy, which would include every possible infraction, since 
a reasonable person would understand that such intentional wrongdoing and base 
9 Page #271 
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13 
Olsen (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
Q. And in what capacity? 
A. Human resource manager. 
Q. How long have you been the human resource 
manager? 
A. One year two months. 
Q. Are you familiar with the records 
concerning the Grievant, Mr. Charles Kent? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q, Have you reviewed those records in the last 
day or so at my request? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell us the date Mr. Kent was 
hired and the job he was hired into? 
A. He was hired on October the 9, 1984 as an 
Accountant 17. 
Q. And is there a working title with that job; 
do you know? 
A. At that time, I don't know. That was the 
official title that he was hired under. 
Q. Okay. What status was he hired into? 
A. It was a status we call TLS. That stands 
for time limited salary. At that time, individuals 
were hired on a •-- it was a contractual period of 
time to perform certain duties for a limited period 
of time. 
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1 Q. Was that a career status? 
2 A. Not at that time. 
3 Q. Do you have a class specification with you 
4 for the job Mr. Kent was hired into? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 MR. ZABEL: We'd like to have this document 
7 marked as an exhibit. 
8 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: That would be 
9 Number 5. 
10 MR. ZABEL: We brought one just for you. 
11 MR. DYER: Okay. 
12 (Agency Exhibit No. 5 was 
13 marked for identification.) 
14 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: This is being 
15 offered as Exhibit 5 after you have reviewed that, 
16 Mr. Dyer. 
17 MR. DYER: I'm sorry. Which one is this? 
18 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: This would be 
19 offered as Exhibit 5. I'll give you a minute to 
20 review and see if there is an objection. 
21 MR. DYER: I haven't seen A-4. I've got 
22 A-l, 2 and 3. 
23 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: I've got A-4 as 
24 this (indicating). 
25 MR. DYER: Okay . I d i d n ' t mark i t down i n 
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1 MR. ZABEL; We'll submit that as evidence. 
2 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: All right. This 
3 will be received if there is no objection. 
4 MR. DYER: No objection. 
5 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: That will be 
6 received as Exhibit A-5. 
7 Q. (By Mr. Zabel) Was Mr. Kent ever changed 
8 to regular career service status? . 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. When did that occur? 
11 A. It was on January the 13th of '86. He was 
12 changed to career — regular career service status. 
13 Q. Was that in the same assignment as far as 
14 you can tell? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Was he later promoted to the position of 
17 field auditor? 
18 A. Yes, he was. 
19 Q. And do you know from the records when that 
20 occurred? 
21 A. That occurred July 23rd of 1990. 
22 Q. And do you have a class specification for 
23 that position, field auditor? 
24 A. Yes. There is three copies of that. 
25 MR. ZABEL: I'll ask that this be marked as 
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1 A. Approximately three years. 
2 Q. When did Mr. Kent come into your unit as a 
3 field auditor? 
4 A. Approximately the first of -- first of 
5 1989, about January of '89. 
6 Q. And do you know what position Mr. Kent 
7 worked in prior to coming into your unit? 
8 1 A. He was a collection officer. 
9 Q. Is that in the same cost center as the 
10 field audit unit? 
11 A. Yes, contributions cost center. 
12 Q. How did Mr. Kent come to be transferred to 
13 field audit? 
14 A. We had a vacancy for a field auditor and he 
15 made application and I selected him. 
16 Q. Were you familiar with his work prior to 
17 your selection? 
18 A. Yes, I was. 
19 Q. And can you explain how you are familiar 
20 with his work, how you first came to know Mr. Kent? 
21 A. I first met Charles in 1984 when he applied 
22 for the job as -- with the Department. What we had 
23 at that time is, we had four vacancies. We had 
24 vacancies for the two field auditors and vacancies 
25 for two collectors, and a registry was prepared 
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Avery (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
combining those requisitions so that all of the 
applicants were applying for both of the jobs, and I 
held the interviews in conjunction with Mr. Frank 
Shaw at the time and he selected two -- Mr. Shaw 
selected two collectors and I selected two field 
auditors from that register. That was my first 
meeting with Charles. 
Q. So you knew about Mr. Kent right from his 
initial hire into the Department? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How well did Mr. -- well, excuse me. Let 
me back up. 
I call your attention to Agency Exhibit 
Number 6, the class specification for Field Auditor 
21. Are you familiar with that class specification? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And would you explain how the duties of 
that job relate -- well, let me back up again. 
Would you explain what the unemployment 
compensation fund is? 
A. The unemployment compensation fund is an 
accumulation of all the unemployment taxes that the 
employers in the State of Utah pay to our Department. 
Q. And how do the duties of a field auditor 
relate to that trust fund? 
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1 A. The field auditors have the responsibility 
2 to audit employers, to verify what they have recorded 
3 on their quarterly reports and make assessments based 
4 upon those audits. They also have the obligation to 
5 contact employers who are delinquent and collect 
6 their unemployment -- their delinquent unemployment 
7 reports and delinquent taxes that are due on those 
8 reports, and they also have the obligation to 
9 actually contact employers who have filed their 
10 reports but who have not made their payments and 
11 collect the taxes that are in arrears. And all of 
12 the money that comes from those contacts will then 
13 eventually end up in the trust fund. 
14 Q. I show you two documents that have the 
15 title Performance Management Plan. Can you identify 
16 these documents? 
17 A. Yes. Those are documents that I prepared. 
18 Q. And are these documents specifically 
19 related to Mr. Kent? 
20 A. They're consistent with the position. 
21 Q. And/ in fact, they have Mr. Kent's name on 
22 them; do they not? 
23 A. Yes, yes. 
24 Q. And do these documents indicate the 
25 objectives of his job as a field auditor? 
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1 when he worked for Mr. Shaw? 
2 A. The only thing that would differ there is 
3 that when he worked for Mr. Shaw, the determinations 
4 had already been made and the taxes were in arrears 
5 and he collected on those taxes that were in arrears. 
6 Q. And as an auditor, what was the difference? 
7 A. That was -- that was -- that was a primary 
8 duty of a collector. An auditor can also establish 
9 the liabilities and then collect on them. 
10 Q. Would you explain who manages the 
11 unemployment compensation fund? 
12 A. It's managed within the contributions 
13 division of the Department of Employment Security by 
14 our trust fund management unit. 
15 Q. Where is the money kept? 
16 A. It depends on where it's at In the process. 
17 Eventually it will end up in -- in -- in the 
18 Department's account with the United States 
19 Government. 
20 Q. When you say eventually, is that a 
21 protracted time that the Department holds it before 
22 it sends it to the United States Government? 
23 A. Right. We have a process where we collect 
24 the money, we deposit it in a clearing account and 
25 then it gets transferred into the trust fund. 
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1 Q. And do you know how long it generally stays 
2 in the clearing account? 
3 A. It's usually not much more than a two- or 
4 three-day turnaround at the most. 
5 Q. So the money is fairly quickly 
6 transferred --
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. to the federal trust fund? 
9 Why is it transferred to the federal trust 
10 fund? 
11 A. Because that's where we earn our Interest 
12 on the trust fund monies. 
13 Q. Is there any federal requirement that the 
14 money go to that fund? 
15 A. Yes. They have very stringent regulations 
16 as far as keeping -- as far as getting the money 
17 through the process as rapidly as possible. 
18 Q. Is the Department obligated, required by 
19 federal law or regulations to put the unemployment 
20 contributions into that federal fund? 
21 A. Yes, yes. We have no option. 
22 Q. With respect to Mr. Kent's performance as a 
23 field auditor, would you explain to the Hearing 
24 Officer what your observations were as his supervisor 
25 in general? 
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1 A- Yes• 
2 Q. Did he indicate what the indictment was for 
3 or what the newspaper article said? 
4 A, He had conveyed the contents, and I asked 
5 him if he would please either mall or fax me a copy 
6 of the article. 
7 Q. And did he do that? 
8 A. Yes, he did. 
9 Q. And what did you do then when you received 
10 the article? 
11 A. I called Charles into my office and we had 
12 a discussion concerning whether or not he was the 
13 gentleman that they were -- that had been indicted 
14 and that the article was referring to. 
15 Q. And how did Mr. Kent answer? 
16 A. He said yes, he was the individual. 
17 Q. And do you recall the nature of the 
18 indictment? 
19 A. He was accused of fraudulently endorsing 
20 ten U.S. Treasury checks. 
21 Q. What did you do then after he acknowledged 
22 that he was the same individual as the article 
23 referred to? 
24 A. I asked him if -- if -- to give me a bit of 
25 an explanation as to how this came about and was 
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1 there any merit to this, at which time he gave me a 
2 brief background of what had transpired and then 
3 professed his innocence. 
4 Q. How did he profess his innocence to you? 
5 Do you recall specifically what he said? 
6 A. He had said that he had had his brother 
7 living with him and it was his brother who had 
8 actually intercepted the checks and had forged them 
9 and cashed them, and that he was not the guilty party 
10 and he had no knowledge of his brother doing this 
11 during that period of time. 
12 Q. Did you say anything further to him at that 
13 time? 
14 A. At that point in time I told him I thought 
15 that, you know, I had never dealt with a situation 
16 such as this before and I would need some further 
17 guidance from management on how to proceed, but in 
18 his best interest and my best interest, especially 
19 since this had now been made public notice in the 
20 newspaper, I would like to -- I restricted his duties 
21 as a field auditor to office duties, that he could 
22 perform in the office. 
23 Q. What kind of duties would that have 
24 included? 
25 A. Primarily working with the telephone to 
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1 secure delinquent contribution reports, working the 
2 telephone to secure status reports from employers who 
3 had not registered with us, and anything else that he 
4 could do that would still contribute to the operation 
5 of the field audit, would still fall within his 
6 responsibilities and job description but would 
7 basically keep him at a lower profile. 
8 Q. Did he handle any trust fund monies in that 
9 capacity? 
10 A. I would say that he probably still did 
11 handle some trust fund monies in that sometimes the 
12 checks will come in addressed to the field auditor as 
13 opposed to just coming in in the general mail, and 
14 it's possible that some did cross his desk. 
15 Q. Would you say that he was under closer 
16 supervision by reason of these restrictions? 
17 A. That was -- yes, he was. That was also the 
18 intent, so that I could again hopefully serve 
19 everybody's interest. 
20 Q. At the time you placed these restrictions 
21 on Mr. Kent, did you say anything to him about why 
22 you were doing it? 
23 A. Again, I reiterated that I had some 
24 concerns about the image that -- that we had worked 
25 so hard to improve as far as being state employees 
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Avery (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 and being auditors. We had done a great deal of work 
2 with customer service, we had done a great deal of 
3 work on public relations, and I felt that there was 
4 some concerns that I had to take into consideration 
5 in that if I had knowingly allowed someone who was 
6 indicted by a federal grand jury for fraud to have 
7 access to trust fund monies on a regular basis or to 
8 have access to employers' confidential financial 
9 records, it had potential embarrassment both to him 
10 and to the Department. 
11 Q. Did you say anything to Mr. Kent about the 
12 possible impact of this indictment and any potential 
13 conviction on his job? 
14 A. Right. At that time I don't believe he had 
15 an attorney, but I told him that he needed to be 
16 aware of, and that at any point he secured legal 
17 Counsel, they needed to very strongly take into 
18 consideration the fact that if he were to plead 
19 guilty or were found guilty, it could have impact 
20 upon his employment. I did not know exactly what 
21 that impact would be, but common sense told me that 
22 it would have implications. 
23 Q. And did you articulate that concern to him 
24 in writing or just verbally? 
25 A. No. It was just verbally. 
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1 Q. Do you recall whether that was at the time 
2 that you told him that his duties would be restricted 
3 to office work? 
4 A. That was at that time and repeatedly during 
5 the course of this situation. 
6 Q. Did you give him any instruction with 
7 respect to the indictment and the prosecution that 
8 was then pending? 
9 A. I don't quite understand that question, 
10 Q. Perhaps I can rephrase it. 
11 Did you ask Mr. Kent to keep you informed 
12 of the progress of the case against him? 
13 A. Yes, I did. I asked him if -- if 
14 throughout this process, if he would keep me updated 
15 as to what was transpiring so that I was aware of --
16 of the situation. 
17 Q. Now, let's walk through the chronology then 
18 of some of the events that followed at this point in 
19 time when you placed him on restricted office duties. 
20 How long was he restricted to office work? 
21 A. Okay, Initially I verbally restricted him 
22 to -- to office responsibilities on approximately May 
23 1st, and at that time I then verbally asked my 
24 supervisor, who is chief of distribution at that 
25 time, Dean Kimber, for some guidance in the matter. 
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1 nothing that he was -- the office duties did not 
2 entail anything that was not covered in his PD 
3 requests, position description questionnaire. 
4 Q. How did Mr. Kent react to this decision to 
5 restrict his duties? 
6 A. He was understanding. 
7 Q. Did you have any further discussion about 
8 his case at that time? 
9 A. Other than what's happening, where are we 
10 at on this, and the continued reassurance that there 
11 was nothing to worry about. 
12 Q. And this conversation and memo were on or 
13 about May 20, '91? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. How long did he remain on restricted 
16 duties? 
17 A. He stayed on restricted duties until his 
18 dismissal. 
19 Q. Why was Mr. Kent placed on restricted 
20 duties? Would you explain that? 
21 A. Field auditors are a very high profile 
22 position within our Department. In fact, they --
23 they're really the only contact that most of our 
24 employer community has with our Department on a 
25 regular basis, and they're placed in a position where 
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1 they're continually handling trust fund monies, not 
2 uncommon, cash. 
3 They also are very often in the employers' 
4 offices where they have access to all the employers' 
5 confidential financial information, bank information. 
6 It's not uncommon to be handed a checkbook that 
7 has -- still has -- that has checks in it. It's not 
8 uncommon for -- and this I have a hard time 
9 understanding -- quite often, just to have a 
10 checkbook where the checks are presigned. And I did 
11 not feel that it would be exercising good judgment on 
12 my part to be putting someone who had been indicted 
13 of -- by a federal grand jury into such an 
14 environment and have the potential of someone, as 
15 remote as it may be, having read this article or 
16 through some way aware that Mr. Kent had been charged 
17 with this crime and having to respond, then having 
18 that taxpayer go to either the administrator, 
19 Governor, or even, worst case scenario, the media and 
20 having this thing blown all out of proportion. 
21 Q. Was there any potential in your mind that 
22 this kind of access to employers' financial records 
23 by someone under indictment, was there potential to 
24 cause harm to the credibility of the Department in 
25 the eyes of employers? 
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Avery (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 to you with this information voluntarily or did you 
2 ask him about it? 
3 A. No, I had to ask him about it. 
4 Q. Did Kr. Kent talk to you from May 20th on 
5 about his job duties? Did he ever have any 
6 complaints? 
7 A, Never received any complaints. There was 
8 probably a periodic exchange between us as far as his 
9 job duties and the workload th,at he had and to 
10 just -- the sort of thing that would go on between a 
11 supervisor and an employee. 
12 Q. And when those kind of discussions 
13 occurred, did you dsk him fartlier about the progress 
14 of the case? 
15 A* There were future discussions, yes# about 
16 the progress of * he rase. It'si mA something that 1 
17 was, you know, every day walking in the office and 
18 calling him into my office and asking for an update. 
19 But when a week or two would go by and, you know, I 
20 would at that point ask for some input as far as what 
21 was transpiring. 
22 Q. At any time did he ever come to you and 
23 say, "I need to bring you up-to-date on my case," or 
24 anything to that effect? 
25 A* Not once. 
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1 Q. In fact, you had to ask him every time what 
2 was going on? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. How did you learn that there was some kind 
5 of a court appearance to be made on August 8, 1991 by 
6 Mr. Kent? 
7 A. To the best of my recollection, I received 
8 a phone call from our benefit payment control 
9 supervisor, Mr. Evan Mattlnson, asking if I was aware 
10 I that Charles had a court appearance, and I was not 
11 aware of such an appearance. I knew that one was 
12 scheduled sometime in the fall, but that was -- that 
13 was the extent of it. 
14 Q. How did you know that it was scheduled in 
15 the fall sometime? 
16 A. I believe one of our conversations where I 
17 had asked for progress, I believe that Charles had 
18 mentioned that to me. 
19 Q. But he did not come to you at any time 
20 prior to August 8th to let you know that he had a 
21 court date? 
22 A. No, he did not. 
23 Q. Do you know what happened at that August 
24 8th court appointment? 
25 A. I understand that he had pled guilty and I 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
 p „-97 
(801) 521-5222 rdge w:> ' 
APPENDIX C (Page 29) 
49 
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1 Q. Do you know what those treasury checks were 
2 for? 
3 A. Charles had told me that they were checks 
4 that had been -- that were intended for his father 
5 who also was Charles Kent. 
6 Q. What kind of checks? 
7 A. I assume retirement checks, Social 
8 Security. 
9 Q. What happened after you learned that he had 
10 pled guilty, and specifically, was sentenced in 
11 I November? 
12 Let me back up if I way. 
13 MR. ZABEL: We'd like to formally offer 
14 Exhibit Number 2. 
15 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Okay. Is there an 
16 objection to Exhibit Number 2? 
17 MR. DYER: My only objection is, I think 
18 our position, and I'll just make it now so 1 can pose 
19 a continuing objection, our position is that because 
20 of the fact that we don't think the conviction is a 
21 basis to sustain termination under the items we set 
22 forth in our brief, we don'i believe that the 
23 document is relevant, but other than that, we would 
24 have no objection. 
25 in other words, our position is that 
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1 conviction of a crime of moral turpitude is not in 
2 compliance with state law so this is not relevant 
3 evidence, but other than that, there is no objection. 
4 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: With that 
5 stipulation, we will receive that into evidence. 
6 MR. DYER: Before you go, Mr,, Avery, do you 
7 have any problem with me just posing that continuing 
8 objection rather than interrupt you? 
9 MR. ZABEL: That's fine. Feel free to 
10 interrupt, too. 
11 MR. DYER: All right. 
12 Q. (By Mr. Zabel) All right. Mr. Avery, if 
13 you would explain what happened then after his guilty 
14 plea and sentencing? 
15 A. Let's see. He pled guilty in August and I 
16 had some verbal discussions with -- with my 
17 supervisor and also the personnel department as to, 
18 you know, what we should do from here. 
19 On September the 13th I addressed a letter 
20 to Terry Burns, the UI director, where I spelled out 
21 what basically had transpired, and concluded my 
22 letter that if his offense did not justify 
23 termination, that I be requested that he be 
24 transferred elsewhere in the department. 
25 Q. And why did you make that request? 
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1 A. It was obvious now that I cannot have an 
2 individual who had pled guilty to a federa. offense 
3 of forgery handling trust fund monies. 
4 Q. And what happened then after you sent that 
5 memo to Mr. Burns? 
6 A. I received a verbal response from Mr. Burns 
7 to proceed with the termination process. 
8 Q. And did you do that? 
9 A. Yes, I did. 
10 Q. How did you do that? 
11 A. On October 4th I believe, I gave -- I gave 
12 Charles a written notification of intent to 
13 discipline through dismissal. 
14 MR. ZABEL: If we may see Exhibit 1, Your 
15 Honor. 
16 Let's try Exhibit 3.. 
17 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Okay. 
18 MR. ZABEL: I apparently put these in 
19 different numerical order. 
20 Q. (By Mr. Zabel) This is Agency Exhibit 
21 Numbei Mr. Avery. Do you recognize it? 
22 A. That's the notice of intent to discipline. 
23 MR. ZABEL: We'll offer that into evidence. 
24 MR. DYER: Subject to my continuing 
25 objection, I have no other objection. 
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1 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Okay. That will be 
2 received as Exhibit 3. 
3 Q. (By Mr. Zabel) And do you know what 
4 happened thereafter? 
5 A. Charles responded on October 23rd with a 
6 written appeal to my intent whereas he said he'd like 
7 to stay in the field audit, but if that wasn't 
8 possible, he would consider work else -- he would 
9 consider work elsewhere in the Department. 
10 Q. All right. And from there, what happened? 
11 Did his response change your recommendation? 
12 A. No. I was obligated then on October 30th 
13 also to generate a written appeal response stating 
14 that I had reviewed his written response and that I 
15 was continuing with the process, and at that point, I 
16 generated a recommendation for disciplinary action 
17 through dismissal to the administrator, Floyd Astin. 
18 Q. Do you know what happened after you sent 
19 that recommendation to Mr. Astin? 
20 A. Charles filed a Career Service Review Board 
21 grievance form grieving the recommendation. 
22 Q. And thereafter? 
23 A. And then on November 15th, there was a 
24 hearing in the administrator's office to -- it was a 
25 dismissal hearing. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
 PflftA « w 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 5 2 2 2 rage #332 
APPENDIX C (Page 33) 
53 
Avery (Direct Examination By Mr, Zabel) ___ 
1 Q. And was Mr. Kent dismissed as a result of 
2 that hearing to your knowledge? 
3 A. Yes. On December 3rd Floyd Astin issued a 
4 disciplinary decision resulting in termination. 
5 MR. ZABEL: That's all the questions I 
6 have. 
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY 
8 BY MR. DYER: 
9 Q. Mr. Avery, you referred to a memo dated 
10 September 13th of '91. Do you have that there in 
11 your file that I can look at? I don't have a copy of 
12 that. The one of Terry Burns is the one I'm 
13 interested in. 
14 MR. DYER: Could we take a break for a 
15 moment so we can get a copy of this perhaps? 
16 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: That would be fine. 
17 Let's take a five-minute break. 
18 (There was a short break taken.) 
19 (Grievant's Exhibit No. 2 was 
20 marked for identification.) 
21 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Let's go back on 
22 the record. 
23 Q. (By Mr. Dyer) Mr. Avery, we have marked 
24 here as Exhibit G-2 a copy of the memo which you 
25 graciously provided us that you wrote to Terry Burns 
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1 on September 13 , 1 9 9 1 ; i s tha t t r u e ? 
2 A. Y e s , s i r . 
3 MR. DYER: I'd move for admission of G-2. 
4 MR. ZABEL: No objection. 
5 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: All right. That 
6 will be received as G-2. 
7 Q. (By Mr. Dyer) Now, Mr. Avery, in this 
8 memo, as I read it, there is no reference in this 
9 memo about any concerns disclosing the August 8th 
10 hearing date. Is that a fair statement? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Prior to becoming chief -- do you remember 
13 the exact date you became chief of contributions? 
14 A. Approximately August of '91. 
15 Q. So it was real close in time to when this 
16 hearing occurred? 
17 A. Uh-huh. 
18 Q. That's a yes? 
19 A. Yes, sir. I'm sorry. 
20 Q. Oh, that's okay. 
21 And Mr. Kimber was the chief prior to you 
22 taking that job? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. And he retired? 
25 A. He resigned. 
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1 Q. Do you know why he resigned? 
2 A. No, I do not. 
3 Q. When he resigned, did he pass on any 
4 information to you that Mr. Kent would have provided 
5 to him concerning this case? 
6 A. He never -- I have not spoken to him since 
7 he left. 
8 Q. So when he l*ft, he didn't give you any 
9 sort of briefing on where things were prior to 
10 leaving? 
11 I A. No. 
12 Q. Did you, in fact, know on August 8th that a 
13 court hearing had occurred thar day? 
14 A. I knew about It that morning; I believe 
15 either that morning or the previous afternoon when I 
16 received a call from Mr, Mattinson. 
17 Q. When you talked to Mr. Mattinson, do you 
18 know if Mr. Mattinson arranged for someone to be 
19 present at that hearing from the Department? 
20 A. Yes, he did. He arranged for a gentleman 
21 by the name of Vincent Iturbe to be present. 
22 Q. Mr. Iturbe apparently did appear? 
23 A. Yes# he did. I got a copy of a memorandum 
24 I believe that he generated to -- I'll have to see 
25 who he generated it to. 
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Avery (Redirect Examination By Mr, Zabel) 
1 A. Well, within the framework that I had 
2 restricted his duties; in other words, restricting 
3 him to the office. I had a concern about his ability 
4 to do the work in the field. Not necessarily his 
5 ability to do it. He could still do the work because 
6 he was trained and qualified, but because of what was 
7 transpiring, I felt very uncomfortable in letting him 
8 out of the office. 
9 I rationalized that by putting myself in an 
10 employer's position. Would I want a state 
11 representative who had either pled or been 
12 convicted -- who had been indicted, who had pled or 
13 had been found guilty of a crime of this nature, 
14 would I want to open up my records to him, give him 
15 access to my most confidential information? Of 
16 course I would not. 
17 Q. As far as the ultimate outcome prior to 
18 August 8th, did you have any reason to believe that 
19 Mr. Kent had, in fact, committed fraud against the 
20 Federal Government? 
21 A. No, I did not. 
22 Q. And why didn't you? 
23 A. I believed him. 
24 Q. When you say you believed him, again, he 
25 made assurances to you that he was innocent? 
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A v e r y ( R e d i r e c t E x a m i n a t i o n By Mr. Z a b e l ) 
1 A. Y e s , he d i d . 
2 Q. And when he pled guilty, how did that 
3 change your attitude? 
4 I A. I quite honestly felt Betrayed. 
5 Q. Was your primary concern at that point with 
6 Mr. Kent's pleading guilty or was it his failure to 
7 voluntarily keep you informed on what was happening? 
8 A. I think both of them. The fact that he had 
9 consistently assured me from April 30th that he was 
10 innocent and then goes in and pleads guilty, be it 
11 even to a lesser charge, I found that very 
12 distressing, and also the fact that -- that 
13 throughout this period, I was the one having to 
14 approach him to get updates as to what was 
15 transpiring. 
16 Q. Why did you find it distressing? 
17 A. Because of the fact that we had been 
18 friends for — I had not only been his supervisor. 
19 Before I became his supervisor, we were friends, and 
20 we were still friends after I became his supervisor, 
21 and for him to profess innocence, and I sincerely 
22 believed that he was innocent through the 
23 conversations that we had had, and then for him to go 
24 into court and plead guilty, that just distressed me. 
25 At what point then do I believe Charles in the future 
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Avery ( R e d i r e c t Examinat ion By Mr. Zabe l ) 
1 on any i s s u e ? 
2 Q. So in other words, did it cause you to los 
3 confidence in to what extent you could rely on him? 
4 A. Yes, it did. 
5 Q. Did you at that point begin to question hi* 
6 honesty as it related to his work? 
7 A. No, I did not. 
8 Q. Did you at that point question in your own 
9 mind whether you could rely and trust him? 
10 A. I did. 
11 MR. ZABEL: I have no further questions. 
12 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Any Recross? 
13 RECROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY 
14 BY MR. DYER; 
15 Q. In your mind, was this a decision involving 
16 Charles' trust and honesty or more of a potential 
17 credibility problem to the Department? 
18 A. I think the two were interrelated. They 
19 both apply. 
20 MR. DYER: I have nothing further. 
21 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Okay. Thank you. 
22 We will excuse you as a witness and let you sit back 
23 as Department representative. Thank you. 
24 The next Department witness. 
25 MR. ZABEL: Could we take another short 
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Astln (Direct Examination By Mr, Zabel) 
1 Agency Exhibit Number 1. Can you identify that? 
2 A. Yes. That is my decision issued in this 
3 matter. 
4 Q. Did you conduct a hearing to consider the 
5 recommendation for dismissal of Mr. Kent? 
6 A. I did. 
7 Q. And is this decision evidenced in Agency 
8 Exhibit Number 1 the result of that hearing? 
9 A. That is correct. 
10 Q. And that was your formal decision on the 
11 matter? 
12 A. Yes, that's correct. 
13 MR. ZABEL: We'll ofrnr it into evidence. 
14 MR. DYER: I have no objection. 
15 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Okay. That will be 
16 accepted into the record. 
17 Q. (By Mr. Zabel) Would you explain your 
18 reasons for determining to dismiss Mr. Kent? 
19 A. Yes. It consisted of a number of things. 
20 I guess the thing that really triggered the thought 
21 process of reaching the decision that I did make, I 
22 guess the document actually speaks for itself, but in 
23 reaching the decision I made, I guess what triggered 
24 it was the idea that there was a plea of guilty by 
25 Mr. Kent in regards to a false claim made against the 
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Astin (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 treasury, and then taking that guilty plea and the 
2 nature of the facts that led up to that plea and 
3 applying those -- that circumstance to the duties he 
4 had with the Department at that time as a field 
5 auditor, trying to determine whether or not this 
6 would interfere with his work, and in my judgment, I 
7 felt that it would, because the work that he was 
8 doing with working as a field auditor, going out with 
9 employers, auditing their books, determining whether 
10 or not they had committed any wrongdoing with the 
11 State of Utah or that their books were accurate and 
12 reporting of their taxes, and also acting as a 
13 collection agent for the Department, collecting 
14 monies on occasion and bringing those monies back to 
15 the Department, I felt that the nature of the -- of 
16 the guilty plea or of the action that was performed 
17 that led to the guilty plea were contrary to the 
18 professional standards that this particular position 
19 required with the Agency and that it would interfere 
20 with his ability to perform his duty in that 
21 capacity. 
22 I felt that the high trust and expectations 
23 of those working as field auditors were such that it 
24 would -- it would jeopardize his ability to perform 
25 the job. However, in addition to that, the thing 
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Astln (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 that weighed upon my mind is the fact that he had 
2 been advised and asked to keep the Department fully 
3 involved with the matter as to wnat was transpiring, 
4 as we found out through the newspaper that this 
5 charge was brought against him by the U.S. 
6 Government, and that was by accident. It wasn't 
7 brought to our attention at the time that we found 
8 out. And that he was asked to keep us informed of it 
9 and failed to do so, us being to his supervisory 
10 line, and he failed to do so. As a matter of fact, 
11 they had to approach him each time as the information 
12 was found out as to the nature **f the charge and 
13 where it might be at any given point. 
14 And I guess finally, at the hearing that I 
15 conducted after going through these very -- these 
16 steps of review in my own mind as to try to determine 
17 what disciplinary action should be taken, I was taken 
18 back somewhat by the -- the demeanor or the approach 
19 that Mr. Kent used, I didn't find any remorse. I 
20 didn't find any moral responsibility being expressed 
21 by Mr. Kent. As a matter of fact, each time that the 
22 issue was discussed, Mr. Kent seemed to take the 
23 position that it was somebody else's fault. He 
24 didn't take any responsibility upon himself as to 
25 what had actually happened. He made it clear to me 
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Astln (Cross-Examination By Mr. Dyer) 
employee, but most of the changes — most of what 
goes on are changes, and they're generally posted on 
a bulletin board, and that so employees, if they have 
any concerns about it, they can make recommendations 
about it. 
Q. Now, under this Dismissals for Cause 
provision, you have, "conviction of a crime involving 
moral turpitude," which is what you cited in your 
decision? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can you tell me when that policy was 
adopted and disseminated to employees that that is a 
basis for dismissal? 
A. To my knowledge, this goes back many years. 
I don't -- I'm not aware of any -- any dates on that. 
Q. So can you tell me with certainty whether 
or not that information is actually conveyed to each 
employee? 
A. Each employee is made aware when they 
come -- employee evaluation when they first come to 
the Department that this information is available as 
to what standards are in employee handbooks and 
supervisor handbooks. Employee handbooks are given 
to all employees and supervisor handbooks are given 
to all supervisors for review by an employee. 
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Astin (Redirect Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 attitude that should be prevalent of a person working 
2 in the capacity he was working in. It caused roe 
3 great concern, as I mentioned, that there would be no 
4 remorse, no owing up to what had happened, even 
5 though there was a guilty plea on the matter. 
6 It certainly weighed in my mind, along with 
7 these other factors, other conviction of the -- it 
8 was just an environment that I was very, very 
I 
9 uncomfortable with. I didn't feel that we had an 
10 employee that would put forth the concern that we 
11 have felt in this area of needing -- have someone 
12 working with the employees that had those kind of 
13 traits, that were straightforward and had an honest 
14 rapport with the Department and were willing to work 
15 with the Department. The mistake had been made. I 
16 didn't see any willingness to work with the 
17 Department and to try to work out the problem at any 
18 point. It was almost like it will go away, it didn't 
19 happen. 
20 Q. Thank you. 
21 Did Mr. Kent ever state to you either in 
22 his hearing or at any other time that he had told the 
23 chief of contributions at that time, Mr. Dean Kimber, 
24 that he had an August 8th hearing date? 
25 A. No. As a matter of fact, that did not come 
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Astln (Redirect Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 out. The questions were asked as to why he didn't 
2 inform his supervisor, and that was never mentioned 
3 he did inform anybody. That was specifically asked 
4 of him. 
5 Q. Did Mr. Kent say to you at any time that he 
6 had told Mr. Kimber or anybody else that he intended 
7 to plead guilty at that August 8th date? 
8 A. Again, that was asked and there was no 
9 indication of doing that. As a matter of fact, the 
10 frustration was expressed by Mr. Avery as to the fact 
11 that he let him think that right up to the point till 
12 he actually made the plea In court, we had no 
13 knowledge of it. It was a surprise to Mr. Avery that 
14 came out of the hearing and there was no rebuttal 
15 against that at all. As a matter of fact, It was 
16 acknowledged. 
17 MR. ZABEL: I have no further questions. 
18 HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Any Recross? 
19 RECROSS-EXAMINATION OF FLOYD ASTIN 
20 BY MR. DYER: 
21 Q. This testimony that you gave about what was 
22 said in that hearing, you are giving your 
23 conclusions? 
24 A. That's correct. It was not recorded. It 
25 was a very informal hearing, although it was open to 
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Kent (Direct Examination By Mr. Dyer) 
1 it. 
2 Q. So at that point in time, you didn't feel 
3 like there was any need for it? 
4 j A. No. 
5 Q. What was the date of the check that you 
6 pled guilty to; do you recall? 
7 A. September 3# 1986. 
8 Q. How much did that check involve? 
9 A. $310. 
10 Q. Why did you plead guilty to that? 
11 A. Seemed like the thing to do. They had 
12 taken handwriting samples from me on two occasions 
13 and the result was officially inconclusive. But when 
14 you're talking with these people, there is always a 
15 constant threat thai t hay di/e tjotng to reopen the 
16 felony charges, and the felony charge would have 
17 killed me. I thought a misdemeanor wouldn't hurt. 
18 Q. Why did you think that? Was that as a 
19 result of consultation with your lawyer? 
20 A. Well, my attorney assured me that he had 
21 handled other cases for other state employees and a 
22 misdemeanor wouldn't hurt. 
23 Q. Who was your lawyer on that? 
24 A. Wendell Bennett. 
25 Q. Did the cost factor of what it would cost 
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Kent (Cross-Examinatlon By Mr. Zabel) 
A. Originally ten. 
Q. And, in fact, checks had been charged, or 
at least the Government was alleging that checks had 
been charged for at least several years prior to 
1986, hadn't they? 
A. For five years, yes. 
Q. A five-year period. When you pled guilty, 
did the Judge ask you if you were pleading guilty 
because of the plea bargain or because you were 
guilty? 
A. They asked me -- they tried to pin down 
plea bargain. They asked me several questions. 
Q. Did the Judge specifically ask you if you 
were pleading guilty because, in fact, you werf 
guilty? 
A. Yes, I think he did. 
Q. And what did you answer to that? 
A. Yes. My attorneys instructed me to. 
MR. ZABEL: I have no further questions. 
HEARING OFFICER GUYON: Any Redirect? 
MR. DYER: Just one follow-up. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF CHARLES D. KENT 
BY MR. DYER: 
Q. You told the Judge that, in fact, you were 
guilty because you were instructed to do so by your 
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Avery (Rebuttal - Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel) 
1 Q. Again, what were your instructions to 
2 Mr. Kent about keeping you informed? 
3 A. Please, keep me updated on the progress of 
4 the situation so that I'll know how to respond, I'll 
5 know how to react, so that nothing comes as a 
6 surprise to me. 
7 Q. Did you ask him to keep Mr. Kimber informec 
8 instead of --
9 A. No, I did not. I was his immediate 
10 supervisor. This thing should have been handled 
11 through me, unless Mr. Kimber had told me otherwise 
12 and I was not told such. 
13 MR. ZABEL: I have no further questions. 
14 MR. DYER: Two things I want to follow up 
15 on real quick. 
16 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY 
17 BY MR. DYER: 
18 Q. Mr. Zabel asked you if you knew about 
19 potential allegations in January, February of 1991 
20 and you responded yes. I think you meant 1990 
21 because it was before the --
22 A. Let me just see. When did he transfer to 
23 Clearfield? Do you have the date? 
24 MR. KENT: March 1st of '90. 
25 A. So then it would have been '90, right. 
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